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CHAPTER I
A CONFRONTATION WITH TECHNOLOGY
"Yet it is not that the world is becoming entirely technical which is really uncanny. Far more uncanny is
our being unpreparedfor this transformation, our inability to be able to confront meditatively what is
really dawning in this age." --Martin Heidegger, Memorial Address
In reading "On the Question Concerning Technology" I sense an immense loss
during Heidegger's discussion of the Rhine River.
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine... In the context ofthe interlocking
processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine appears to be
something at our command... What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier, derives out
of the essence of the power station. l
It is not the physical presence of the power station, cut into the bank of the river, which
causes unease upon reading this passage. What Heidegger asks us to consider is more
shocking and appalling than whether or not one believes the station to "ugly" or
"detrimental to the ecosystem." The feeling ofloss arises when we acknowledge what
the construct of the power station itself indicates. When the station is not viewed simply
as a technological apparatus, but becomes questionable in relation to its activity for
securing power, we are able to see that it is not merely a means under the command of
the human; its presence and activity, when made questionable, indicate a radical shift in
how humans relate to the river. Under the command of the station, the river appears as if
it flows for the sake of fueling the power plant instead of in and for itself. Heidegger's
illustration of the Rhine River shows that we have somehow acquired the ability to look
past the river's majestic qualities in order to translate both what and how it is only in
terms of the work that it accomplishes for the power station that has been set into it.
I Martin Heidegger, trans. William Lovitt, "The Question Concerning Teclmology," The Question
Concerning Technology (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), 16.
2This view ofthe river is horrifying for those who walk along its banks, enjoying
its continual movement and the habitat it provides for animal life; all the same, it is clear
that rivers have come to be interpreted and used in this way. Those who oppose
technological development and seek to protect nature from this seemingly foreign
invasion often offer responses which claim that these advancements are a violation of
"the natural order of things" or are disrespectful to the "inherent dignity of nature." This
position is taken up in response to the feeling of unease that one experiences upon
comprehending the power that technology has to alter the appearance of nature. Still, this
position remains ineffectual as long as it bases its claims simply upon this feeling, or love
of nature, as this form of resistance has neither the power to stop the domination of the
earth nor comprehend what the rise of technology means for us.
If one is disturbed by the transformation of nature that is appearing through
technological advancement, their disturbance remains nothing more than a mere feeling if
they simply claim that this new interpretation or use is a violation of nature, or that life
should be valued on its own terms. It is dangerous to be so naive as to believe that
recourse to aesthetic beauty alone would be sufficient to counter the increasing
preponderance of the technological view of nature. No matter how loudly its opponents
clamor, technological advancement continues. What remains to be understood is that this
feeling itself rests upon a commonsensical dichotomization of "nature" and "technology."
While this opposition may seem "natural" to many, it overlooks the fact that from this
perspective both nature and technology are only understood through their opposition.
According to this thinking neither nature nor technology are understood on their own
terms. If this is the case, how could anyone claim to defend "nature," since it is only
really understood as that which is "not-technological"? Without understanding the
original unity that makes this dichotomous relationship possible the "natural perspective"
remains blind to its own position. From this it is obvious that it could never attain the
power to stop, or even comprehend, what is occurring in and through technological
advancements, as this appears simply as "the opposition." At the same time, the
powerlessness of this position does not imply that the "technological perspective" is a
superior to "naturalism." Heidegger does not ask us to decide for or against either of
3these perspectives. He asks us to seek an alternate view of both nature and technology,
one in which each term is not understood simply as a negation of the other, but one that
understands each, on its own terms, through a recognition of their essential unity.
Those who seek to preserve an interpretation of the river that does not reduce it to
a mere means for the power station can no longer rely upon an instinctual repugnance for
the technological demands that are placed upon nature. The project that seeks to both
comprehend and freely relate to technology, instead of giving oneself passively over to it,
requires a new point of departure. What is important here is that we do not simply do
away with the feeling of loss that was experienced in with the transformation of the
Rhine. Instead of becoming outraged or disenchanted by this feeling, it should be put to
use by prompting an investigation into what is becoming manifest through the rise of
technology and how this seemingly human contrivance has the power to fundamentally
alter our relationship to nature. This investigation demands that we suspend, or put into
question, our presuppositions about both nature and technology. In doing this we are
prevented from deciding in advance which "position" we would like to defend and in
tum, open ourselves to an exploration into the unknown. Those who have the strength to
follow this investigation to its "conclusion" will see that from the desire to preserve a
more traditional interpretation of nature, we will be challenged to acknowledge and take
seriously this "new" interpretation that is manifesting itself. Through this we will see
how this new view holds within it the power to offer an unforeseen perspective into how
nature accomplishes its self-showing and will thus, force us to come into a new relation
with nature, technology and ourselves.
4CHAPTER II
TECHNOLOGY: INSTRUMENTALITY AND TRUTH
"We are not each selfsufJicient, but are in need a/much." --Socrates, Republic, Book I
"Questioning builds a way." --Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology
How is it that we are able to comprehend the need to develop and use the forces
of nature for our own ends, and, at the same time, also feel as if this use is a violation of
the natural order of things? Moreover, even as we confront and question this feeling, do
we not also become terrified as we find ourselves powerless to stop this "transformation"
of nature, as if something greater than us has started us along a path which threatens to
destroy any sort of meaningful relationship between humans and nature? If humans have
created this situation, how is it possible that we do not have control over it? Could we
get hold of the situation? It is with regard to these questions that Heidegger begins his
work on and confrontation with the essence of technology.
I would like to explore why Heidegger takes up the question concerning
technology and what importance that this might hold for us today. I will explicate what
Heidegger means when he tells us that "technology is a way of revealing" and how this
demands an exploration of the history of revealing or truth. We will see that the question
concerning technology is a way in which the question concerning truth as such is able to
confront us. Only once we have begun on the path that seeks to understand the essence
of technology do we become attentive to that which grounds it appearance, and only then
are we able question into how revealing as such comes to pass. By drawing our gaze
away from technological apparatuses and turning toward technology's essential relation
to truth itself, through tracing it back to its origin, we become capable of seeing that what
is occurring in our current historical moment is but one mode in which that ground
reveals itself to us; and yet, we will not remain satisfied in knowing that technology is
only as one way of revealing among others, as Heidegger encourages us to investigate
5what is new in technological revealing. It is this question which offers us the unique
opportunity to experience anew our relation to the happening of truth, and it is this
experience which will demand that we come into a new relation with ourselves.
The difficulty in this project is in the fact that we tend to think of visibility only in
terms of physical entities, but how do you catch sight of something that is not a
"physical" entity? This requires that we inquire into the manifold ways in which
visibility is possible, which will require an analysis of causality as such. Through this,
we will gain access to the question of Being, as Heidegger sees it, and only then will we
become capable of addressing the ways in which Being appears to us. Once we have
determined how technology allows us to open up the question of the truth of Being we
will then see the need to tum to an interpretation of history that becomes attendant to the
appearance of this truth. Only through this historical adventure will we become capable
of understanding our own historical moment within its proper limits and thus, free
ourselves from it, in such a way as to live with it as well as surpass it.
Heidegger seeks to understand our current situation not by demonizing science
and the instruments of technology. The task to be accomplished does not seek to "get rid
of' technology in order to return us to an "ideal" ancient world. This would be
impossible and simplistic. The flight from one polar opposite into the other never
comprehends that which makes the opposition itself possible. The task before us
demands neither a reversal nor reversion to times past, but a more essential view of
modem technology. In order to understand its appearance it is not enough that we
speculate about modern science and seek to lay blame upon those who produce
technological instruments. The task before us requires that we tum toward a way of
viewing the problem that makes it possible for us to see how technology has come about
and how it claims us.
How should we comprehend technology? We engage technical instruments every
day. Isn't it obvious what technology is? On the one hand, we do comprehend
technology. It is that with which we accomplish our daily tasks. The technological exists
within that domain of objects which we use to obtain desired results, i.e. the domain of
tools and instruments, or more generally, means. But does the fact that we put
6technology to work necessarily mean that we know what it is? Heidegger tells us that
this common interpretation of technology is not sufficient. But how is it that we do not
have knowledge of that which we are so familiar, something that we deal with on a daily
basis? Isn't technology something which we have made for our own use? Each of these
questions tells us how we view technology: that it is something that we possess and use
for our own ends. But isn't it also the case that we have become concerned with
technology because we are begimling to see that this is not simply the case?
The question concerning technology cannot be answered, nor even seen as a
question unless it is made clear that the issue here is not a concern with technological
tools, but the essence of technology. Ifwe want to understand what technology
essentially is, it must be made clear that, for Heidegger, the question of what something is
cannot be separated from the question of how something has arisen as an object of
inquiry. For example, if we are interested in knowing what a silver chalice is, it is not
enough to give a description of its attributes. Only through an analysis of the different
avenues through which the chalice's appearance was made possible are we fully able to
see how the chalice has come to stand before us as an object of inquiry. If one is merely
attentive to its outward appearance and is satisfied with a description of this in order to
understand its "whatness," they are not able to comprehend the various ways in which the
chalice is what it is. The assumption that one can known in advance that what something
is by being attentive to something's outward appearance alone, covers over those aspects
of the object that remain hidden from view, but belong to it even in its completed form.
By failing to consider how an object has become the being that it is, certain aspects of
that thing remain obscured thus, placing limits upon one's knowledge ofthe object itself.
Heidegger refuses to be satisfied with simply viewing the outward appearance of
an object to determine what it is. He demands that attention be given to the manner in
which something has come about if we are to fully comprehend it. From this we are able
to see that, like the chalice, if we attempt to only describe how technology appears to us
without looking into the various avenues that it has traversed in order to reach us today,
we will pass over hidden elements that belong to technology itself. By allowing
ourselves to pass over these we will risk failing in our attempts to understand what
7technology essentially is and thus, abandon ourselves to those explanations of technology
that continually describe it as a mere means. Heidegger's claim is that this continual
recourse to the outward appearance of some thing, as the standard for understanding what
a thing is, arises out of an insufficient understanding of causality. If we have decided in
advance that it is not important how some thing has come to presence, then we have
already made certain assumptions about what it is to be a being; and yet, we are so
removed from the question of cause that we are not even aware of these assumptions as
assumptions. By failing to understand that our thinking grounds itself upon these, it is
impossible for us to understand the consequences that they carry for our thinking. Thus,
in order to meaningfully reflect upon technology, we must also confront ourselves in our
own thinking. As we begin our approach, we should remind ourselves that "Reflection is
the courage to put up for question the truth of one's own presuppositions and the space of
one's goals.,,2 Thus, we will follow Heidegger as he guides us along the way that might
allow us to see the limitations of our current thinking about causality and how this might
make it possible for us to establish new goals for ourselves.
Heidegger has made it clear that if we want to know what technology is, in a way
that surpasses our current interpretation, it clear that we must discover how it has made
its appearance in today' s world. This insistence on the necessary relationship between
what something is and how it has come to be present is not original to the thinking of
Heidegger. He himself honors an Aristotelian approach to the question ofwhat- it-is-to-
be a being and on various occasions Heidegger invites us to turn to Aristotle in order to
gain a fresh perspective on approaching a problem. This thinker, who stands at the
beginnings of our own philosophical heritage, is in relation to us, but remains at a
distance. Often this distance is helpful for gaining a new perspective on problems that
seem so familiar to us, because, as heirs to Aristotle's questioning, our thinking remains
tied, but irreducible, to his due to the twenty-five hundred years of philosophical history
that stands between us. This historical legacy has informed our thinking in ways that
Aristotle could have never foreseen; and yet, this should not be interpreted as a hindrance
2 Martin Heidegger, ed. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, "Age of the World Picture,"
Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57.
8on either side if, in turning to Aristotle, we affirm the distance and difference between us
as something that might hold value for us in our attempts to question into the unknown.
If we continue to ask the same questions as Aristotle, but do so in a way that is different,
it may become possible, through this difference, to free ourselves up from the familiarity
that obscures the questions from us.
Aristotle's treatise on nature deals specifically with the inner relation between the
questions of what and how and the most apparent point of entry for this question is found
in its opening where Aristotle tells us:
Since, in all pursuits in which there are sources or causes or elements, it is by way of our
acquaintance with these that knowing and understanding come to us (for we regard ourselves as
knowing each thing whenever we are acquainted with its first causes and first beginnings, even
down to its elements) ... 3
We see here that when we want to have knowledge of what something is, it is necessary
for us to determine how that thing stands with regard to its source. In other words, we
consider ourselves to have knowledge of something only once we have determined how
the object of inquiry has come about as that which we encounter.4 For example, when we
describe what a plant is we can give a detailed account of its attributes, its location and its
life span. However, if one does not include a discussion of how the plant rises from the
earth through the power of its own self-motion, something truly essential about the life of
the plant has been left out of the account. The one who desires knowledge of this or that
plant is not said to have knowledge of what a plant is if they are not given, or able to give
to themselves, an account for this living activity that belongs to all plants. Thus, we do
not consider one to truly know what a plant is if they lack this essential understanding of
how the plant comes to presence.
3 Aristotle, trans. Joe Sachs, Aristotle's Physics (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2001), Book I
Ch. I In. 184a.
4 It is important to note that this claim is not made, or honored, due to some ancient authority that
Heidegger attributes to Aristotle himself. The force of Aristotle's claim lies in the fact that it sets before us
the way in which "we regard ourselves as knowing". This manner of inquiry into 'what-it-is-for-
something-to-be' is necessarily bound to the questions of the 'why' and the 'how' of something's coming
to presence, not because it has approach has been given to us from the outside or from without, but because
we, as humans, agree upon this as the way in which knowledge manifests itself to us.
9It is clear from what has been said above that if we are to fully comprehend what
technology is we must discover its cause or origin and the way in which it has arisen
from this. But how can we even begin to conceive of the origin or cause of technology?
How are we to look for something if we don't already know what it is? If we allow
Aristotle to guide us further in our beginnings, it is clear that we are not abandoned to our
own devices, as the saying goes. While Aristotle has already alerted us to the need for us
to be attentive to how something is if we want to know what something is, he continues
by bringing our attention to how this knowing arises for us in the lines that follow:
The natural road is from what is more familiar and clearer to us to what is clearer and better
known by nature; for it is not the same things that are well known to us and well known simply.
For this reason it is necessary to lead ourselves forward in this way: from what is less clear by
nature but clearer to us to what is clearer and better known by nature. 5
He cautions us to be aware of the fact that we begin at a distance from the cause of
something and that there is a way in which we must proceed toward this cause if we wish
to come into a knowing relationship with our object of inquiry. This passage along the
"natural road" requires that we question how things first appear to us in order to gain
access to how they appear with regard to nature. It is only through this passage of
discovery that we are able to comprehend what something is "simply" or as it appears by
nature. It seems, then, that we are dealing with two orders here: the order of being or
"nature" and the order of our knowing. Even as it seems as if these two oppose one
another, Aristotle encourages us to carry ourselves along in such a way as to become able
to witness each order, in its own right, so that we might have sufficient knowledge of a
being through the relationship of both perspectives; and yet, we must remain attentive to
the fact that this can only be accomplished if we begin in a way that is possible for us.
If we are to proceed according to Aristotle's instruction, we must regard things as
they first appear to us. This experience will open up our inquiry, if we consider this
initial confrontation with the outward appearance of some thing, not as an exhaustive
experience of it, but as the point of entry to the unfolding of the way that it has come to
5 Aristotle, Physics, Book I, Chapter lIn. 184a.
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presence. This unfolding is a process, a movement of dis-covery, through which we gain
access to that which has made possible, or given rise, to the thing in question. This
process inverts our common notions about things in such a way that it forces us to
undermine, or set aside, what we think we know about something, as it appears to us, in
order to venture toward the foundations of that thing so as to witness how it has arisen
and been able to appear to us in the current way that it stands before us. Looking to the
thing in question in such a way requires that we look at it in its becoming by way ofhow
it appears to us. Only through this passage toward that from out of which something has
arisen, are we able to catch sight of that which guides and is guided through this
becoming. Thus, this manner of inquiry seeks to witness the thing that comes to be
present as it stands in relation to its source, not by radically separating one from the other,
but by understanding each by placing them into a proper relation with one another, so that
we can see them both in their unity and difference.
The problem that we are beginning to confront is two-fold. It seems as if we are
at a loss with regard to both technology and its cause. How are we to begin if we do not
know either? If we allow ourselves to listen to the words of Aristotle, we have already
been given both the starting point for our inquiry and the manner in which we are to
proceed. We must begin where we are. Even if we do not yet have sufficient clarity with
regard to either technology or its origins, we do have some relationship to it, as we
commonly talk about technology itself in casual discourse. Therefore, we do have a
certain kind of understanding of technology and its cause. This means that if we are not
immediately clear about the origin of technology there is still a possibility for us to come
into a knowing relationship with it if we proceed in a way that is appropriate to the
matter.
If we are to begin where we are, we first must consider the way in which
technology appears to us. In order to see how people commonly discuss technology, one
need only tum to the internet to see what people are saying about it. Here technology is
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described as, "a means of empowerment,,,6 or "a worthy means to spread the gospel."? In
short, technology is commonly described as an instrument by means of which humans are
able to cause an effect, which, in turn, fulfills some necessity or other. When we
conceive of technology in this way, we also posit its cause. If technology is viewed as
nothing more than the instrumental, then its cause lies in human agency. Heidegger calls
this interpretation the "anthropological and instrumental definition oftechnology."s This
description makes sense to us. Haven't we sufficiently understood the technological as
instrument when we recognize that it is the craftsperson himself who puts to work the
instrument, as a means, in order to form some material into a design that has been pre-
established, so as to attain an end or product? Isn't it by the work of another craft that the
instrument for this work has been made? Have we not solved our problem, as this tells us
both what technology and its cause are? Is this not the quintessential image of causality
and the way in which the tool fits into the schema: craftsperson, means and end?
While this is one way in which to view the technology and its cause, Heidegger
claims that this interpretation is insufficient and does not yet hit upon that which is
essential in technology; and yet, from this first approach one thing has become clear: the
inquiry into instrumentality remains bound to an inquiry into causality as such.9 Since
the question concerning technology requires of us that we become attentive to how
technology initially confronts us, we must make an investigation into the way technology
appears as an instrument. While it is clear that we view and use technology in its
instrumentality, it is not the case that we have sufficient knowledge as to how it has come
about as an instrument for us. When we assume, in advance, to know what technology is
and how it has arisen by giving it the name instrument, we close ourselves off from the
6 Parsons, Carl. "Communications Technology as a Means to Empowerment". Journal ofFamily Studies.
31 April 1997 < http://jfs.e-contentmanagement.com/archives/vo1/3/issue/1/article/2542/communication-
technology-as-a-means-of-empowerment.
7 Edward, Joseph S. "Technology Proves Worthy Means to Spreading the Gospel". CIO Decisions
Midmarket IT Leadership Awards. 18 June 2008 <http://searchcio-
midmarkeUechtarget.com/generic/0,295582,sid183_gci1317181 ,00.htm1#.
8 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 5.
9 Ibid., 6.
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way that allows us to gain knowledge about the technology that surrounds us. Today, we
only see the resulting effects of technology as what is essential about technology, but
does this view of technology keep us from seeing it for what it truly is? When we focus
on the technological as simply the result of our own power, aren't we accepting 'what
appears to us' as sufficient understanding of its cause?
By beginning our inquiry in attendance to how technology appears to us we have
started along a way that requires us to explore causality as such. When we allow
ourselves to be satisfied with the interpretation that claims the essence of technology as
residing in instrumentality, we attribute human agency as its cause. But can we take
responsibility for the appearance of instrumentality as such? Heidegger tells us, "If we
inquire, step by step, into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we
shall arrive at revealing.,,10 Ifwe are to follow Heidegger to this end, it is clear that we
must proceed in a way that the matter itself demands. Thus, we must tum toward a
discussion of means, and therefore causality as such, in order to witness how our
understanding of technology is opened up through this.
We consider ourselves to be the cause of technology when it is viewed as a means
that we ourselves bring about for our use, but Heidegger cautions us by reminding us that
"not only that by means of which something else is effected is a cause."ll The danger that
threatens our inquiry into the essence of technology is our desire to remain satisfied with
our common notions about cause and how it is that it brings about an effect. Today,
when we think of cause and desire to know what has brought something to come about,
we automatically narrow down our search to the area of objects or agents. We ask: what
thing has brought about and put to work the means for this result? Heidegger tells us that
we think this way because we have come to understand cause as simply the causa
efficiens. l2 But if we remain attentive to the philosophies of the past, it is clear that this
cause is only one way in which beings are understood as arising into presence. We close
10 Ibid., 12.
11 Ibid., 6.
12 Ibid., 7.
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ourselves off from witnessing the various ways in which beings become what they are by
assuming that this is the only way in which beings are brought about. Thus, we close
ourselves off from essential knowledge of beings through our own assumptions about
reality.
If our narrow interpretation of causality closes us off from understanding how
beings come to presence, we must free ourselves up from this interpretation. In order to
proceed from things as they appear to us, toward how they appear of their own accord,
we must consider how causality has been discussed by philosophers of the past. Only
through this engagement will we begin to move toward that which we desire to know.
Heidegger reminds us that throughout the history of philosophy we have been taught that
there are four causes: the causa materialis, causa formalis, causa finalis and causa
efficiens. Together, these are the four ways, or the four-fold way, in which the Greeks
understood how something comes to presence. Still, Heidegger seeks not only to bring
our attention to the fact that there is more than one way to think cause, he asks the
decisive question: "From whence does it come that the causal character of the four
causes is so unifiedly determined that they belong together?"l3 This question requires
that we not only take note of the various ways in which something might be understood
as coming to presence, but demands that we think through how these causes necessarily
stand in relation to one another in an essential unity.
Still, Heidegger does not rest in simply naming this four-fold, telling us "but
everything later ages seek in Greek thought under the conception and rubric 'causality,'
in the realm of Greek thought and for Greek thought per se has simply nothing at all to do
with bringing about and effecting.,,14 The Greek understanding of "cause" can be heard
in the original name for cause, as aitia, or responsibility. Heidegger encourages us to
witness the four causes are the four ways in which something is responsible for
13 Ibid., 7.
14 Ibid., 7.
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something else. ls Our inquiry rests upon our ability to understand what and therefore,
how cause is as responsibility. 16 Why would Greek thinkers understand cause as
responsibility? A responsibility for what? Heidegger tells us "the four ways of being
responsible bring something into appearance."I? Each of the four cause are a way in
which that which comes to presence is "occasioned" or induced to come forward into
presence from out of concealment. Each of the four causes work together, each
according to its own aspect, through which a being is gathered into itself and thus
becomes able to appear as that which it is.
Thus, causality, thought in its fullest sense cannot be understood through recourse
to human agency alone, but is the source from which all coming to presence arises. The
four-fold cause is that which is responsible for that which appears to us. From this it is
clear that technology cannot be a mere means that the causa efficiens uses to produce an
end, because causality cannot be reduced to this kind of operation. According to the
Greek determination of causality, beings do not come to presence through a single cause
and a freely chosen means for it execution, but only through the cooperation of the
manifold dimensions of causality itself. Technology as a mere means has no place in this
operation, because it would deny the causa materia/is, causaformalis and the causa
./inalis their power to be responsible in the process of a being's coming to presence.
Heidegger reminds us that the Greeks did not think of the coming to presence of
beings in terms of craftwork alone, but also in terms of how things come to be by nature.
This coming forth from out of itself falls under the heading ofpoiesis. 18 This coming to
15 I use the term "witness" here so as to make clear that these relations are always already operative within
causality, and that it is through our own neglect that they are no longer clear to us. Thus, it is our
responsibility to return them to our view.
16 In order to grasp the Greek meaning of aitia we must suspend our common notions about responsibility
that regard this term only in its moral sense, as this does not exhaust the manifold ways in which
"responsibility" can be understood. Heidegger tells us, "Today we are too easily inclined to understand
being responsible and being indebted moralistically as a lapse, or else to construe them in terms of
effecting". Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 9. The aition are those forces,
which when brought into unison, give allow a being to come into appearance. Thus, responsibility must be
thought in terms of giving rise to possibility, not in terms of a moral imperative.
17 Ibid., 9.
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presence, either according to craft or according to nature, is a process of revealing
through which 'that which comes to presence' arises from out of concealment. Thus,
when we become attentive to that which is, according to its cause, we become attuned to
this coming to presence as a revealing of that which previously was not yet visible. The
Greek word for revealing is aletheia, which in later times comes to be translated as truth.
Heidegger tells us that "techne is a mode ofaletheuein. It reveals whatever does not
bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before US."l9 Poiesis, techne and technology
are modes of "bringing-forth" which, gather together the four causes and rules over
them?O In this way, technology can no longer simply be understood as it first appeared.
If technology is to be understood from the perspective offered by Greek thought, we are
now able to see that like techne, what is decisive in the revealing does not reside in its
being manipulated as a mere means. We see that each is essentially a way ofrevealing
that allows for a being to come to presence by way of a gathering together of all the
causal aspects that are required for the revealing. Therefore, technology itself, as a way
of revealing, can never be reduced to one of the causes that cooperate within the
revealing itself, but must be witnessed in its ruling over these.
If we remain attentive to the way in which beings are understood to come to
presence according to Greek thought, we will open a space within which we might be
able to comprehend how technology can also be understood as a "way of revealing," or a
way of truth. Heidegger himself tells us that technology comes to presence in the realm
where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth happens?l Ifthis is
the case, then we can no longer take responsibility for its appearance. But this is not to
say that we have failed in our investigation of what technology is. We risk failure only if
we deny what has come to light as this impasse confronts us. We can no longer take
responsibility for the appearance of technology as such, because this does not belong to
18 Ibid., 10.
19 Ibid., 13.
20 Ibid., 12.
21 Ibid., 12.
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us as a possibility. Technology comes to presence as a way of revealing; it is a mode of
truth. As we delve into our way of thinking that is concerned with technology,
surprisingly, the question concerning the appearance of truth itself confronts us. This
question necessarily confronts us because when we take seriously the question of what
technology is, it becomes clear that this questioning builds the way to the question
concerning causality, which in tum opens up for us the possibility to begin questioning
into the realm of truth. From this we see that technology, causality and the realm of truth
belong to one another in an essential way and only through this movement from how
technology confronts us, toward its cause, are we capable of gaining access to its
essential ground.
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CHAPTER III
WAYS OF REVEALING: rECHNE AND TECHNOLOGY
"Always the unconcealment ofthat which is goes upon a way ofrevealing. "
--Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology
If technology is a way of revealing, let us focus on how this is to be understood.
In order to bring this into view I will offer an analysis of what Heidegger interprets as
"new" in modem technology; and yet, this analysis can only be accomplished in relation
to an analysis of techne. Only by viewing these two in their difference will we see how
the revealing of modem technology differs from this older revealing and can therefore, be
deemed new. It is important to remind ourselves that what is essential in technical
revealing is not determined by the productive process of a technician, but is located in
how techne, as a mode of truth makes possible the gathering of each co-cause to one
another. In this way we are able to see that when it is understood in its essence, techne is
a way in which beings come into unconcealment. Thus, techne cannot be determined by
any of the co-causes themselves, but must be understood as a way of revealing beings. If
technology is to be understood as a mode of truth as well, it is necessary to determine
how it gathers together this four-fold. What we will see is that what is new in modem
technology is made possible by what Heidegger speaks of in the term Ge-stell and that
this gathering power, instead of allowing the human to become attentive to the
possibilities that are offered by beings themselves, challenges the human to set upon
nature so as to reveal it as a source of energy. By attending to what Heidegger means in
and through this term we will finally be able to fully appreciate the urgency in
questioning technology, as our analysis of what is new in this way of revealing will also
open up how technology and the human are intimately bound to one another and how this
intimacy brings with it a power which threatens to destroy the essence of humanity itself.
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During our initial approach techne was described as falling under the heading of
poiesis, as a way in which 'that which comes to presence' arises from out of
unconcealment. The processes of techne can be seen as the co-operation of the human
with the forces of nature, in that the craftsperson gathers together and sets to work that
which is offered up for use through a prior vision of what is to be produced. In this way,
the craftsperson is co-responsible for the coming to presence of the produced thing, as he
or she works with that which is given by nature for use. The gathering that is
accomplished by the craftsperson is made possible through her ability to be responsive to
her situatedness within the world and toward beings, and this responsiveness, in turn,
allows the craftsperson be attentive to the various standards that are set by the work itself.
These are found through consideration of the other co-causes that work in unison to bring
forth the produced end.22
This power to consider how each cause relates to the other is the unique ability
that the craftsperson exercises as the causa efficiens. This does not give the craftsperson
the power to decide independently from the other causes what is needed for the
accomplishment of the work, but merely establishes the proper limits to the power or
responsibility of this cause. According to this interpretation, the power of the causa
efficiens lies not simply in its ability to cause an effect, but is more fully understood when
it is viewed in its ability to gather together each aspect of the work to be accomplished in
such a way that the final product can be set forth from out of concealment as an
independent thing. Within the gathering-revealing of techne each co-cause must be
allowed to accomplish its own specific power in order for the work to succeed, therefore,
if the craftsperson is to accomplish her work as the causa efficiens, she must consider
how the other causes demand to be put to work. It is only through this responsiveness to
each that the craftsperson accomplishes her part of the work and thus, allows the
revealing made possible in techne itself to unfold into presence.
22 These causes are the causa materialis (material cause), causaformalis (formal cause) and the causa
finalis (telic cause). The craftsperson stands as the causa efficiens, or that cause which draws together and
sets to work the other causes which are to be considered, within this paradigm. Thus, the power of the
craftsperson is oflimited scope and has a specific part to playas it participates in the mode of truth that
falls under the heading of techne.
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This mode of revealing can easily be made more concrete through an example.
For instance, when a carpenter decides that he is going to construct a table he must
consider certain things before he begins working. While the construction can begin with
a contemplation of any of the co-causes, this analysis will concern a table that is
constructed for the sake of some intended use.23 This work must begin with the
carpenter's consideration of the telic cause, or his decision of how the table is going to be
used. He must consider whether it will need to endure the stresses of dining, or if it will
only endure the light usage of an end table, or if it will be an object of observation and
thus, serve no use function. Each of these different uses place different demands upon
the table itself, as a dinner table bares a much greater load than an end table, and a piece
of art may be made for the sole purpose of being viewed, never having any need to bare a
load. Thus, each use demands a certain quality of material to be used which will be
capable of satisfying the intended use, i.e. a dining table will need to be made from a
sturdier wood than an end table, while the material that would go into a piece of art
would likely be considered for its aesthetic qualities. Along with this decision the
carpenter must also consider the form into which the material is to be shaped. While this
cause can be played with to a certain extent by the carpenter, both the telic and material
causes themselves place internal limits upon the possibilities that the form may take.
Thus, within this schema, the carpenter is appropriately viewed as the one who gathers
together all aspects of the work, insuring that the table will become manifest in the way
that it was initially intended. Through the carrying out this activity, by attending to his
proper limits, the carpenter accomplishes the revealing that is unique to this mode of
truth.
This illustration shows how each aspect of the four-fold causality of a table must
work in unison in order to bring a produced thing into unconcealment. The disclosure
was successful because each cause was allowed to be responsible for its own aspect of
bringing the table to presence. In this light, the craftsperson cannot be interpreted as
23 The construction could also arise out of some desire on the part of the carpenter to use a precious piece of
wood to make a beautiful table. If this were the case, both the telic and formal causes would have to be
determined from out ofa consideration of the limits of the material cause.
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lording over the other causes, or seen as a cause that has the power to work independently
from all others. While it is true that the carpenter does have the power to make the final
decisions upon both the form and the material that goes into the table, he has the power
neither to ignore any of the causes nor to dictate the way in which these cooperate within
the work itself. The power that the craftsperson has is immense, as he has the power to
shape nature to suit his desires; and yet, this power is limited by the possibilities that are
offered to him by beings. From this discussion it has been made clear that revealing of
techne is not understood when it is viewed as some metaphysical empowerment of the
human over nature, but is only fully comprehended when the human is allowed to take on
an appropriate role as co-cause by standing in proper relation to the power that is
afforded through this mode of truth.
Within this mode of presencing, the maker is viewed as but one of the
indispensible, corresponding forces at work in this process of revealing. This is carried
out for the sake of revealing some thing into worldly presence. In his essay "Techne and
Technology," William Lovitt offers an elegant and concise description of how the human
operates within the corresponding processes of technical production:
Through techne man, himself acting in power, confronts the overwhelming powerful reality that
meets him in its confusedness. His knowing rises superior to that reality. As a seeing-doing, it
comprehends the relations subsisting among the latter's components, cuts into their given
structuring, and reassembles them in letting something new stand forth as present. When this
happens, both relations and distinctions first become genuinely manifest.24
The technical process described here attests to the awesome power that the human has to
shape nature into something new, or not yet manifest. Anyone who has thought through
this power and how it remains dependent upon the possibilities offered to it by nature
would hear this as a furtherance of our current discussion of techne as a way of revealing.
When Lovitt tells us, "His knowing rises superior to that reality" we are now conditioned
to hear this as a description of the power of the causa efficiens, as the one who's power
rests in his ability to take a step back from the other co-causes, so as to stand over them
and organize them in a way that is demanded by this mode of truth itself. This is
24 William Lovitt, "Techne and Technology," Philosophy Today 24 (Spring 1980): 64.
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interpretation is supported by the last sentence, "When this happens, both relations and
distinctions first become genuinely manifest." Thus, when the causa efficiens attends to
its proper duties all the co-causes are able to work together, which means at the same
time in distinction from one another, and thus accomplish the revealing of an independent
thing.
Even as a description such as this is used to support this interpretation of the work
of techne, it is important to note that it speaks from out of an engagement with the
manifold character causality. Lovitt's description of the human's role in the processes of
techne could also be interpreted in the following way: the human is the being that is able
to assume the role of master over the given "material" of "confused nature" and, due to
"his" superior intellect, is first able to "fix" nature's improper way of appearing into an
intelligible pattern. Sir Francis Bacon assumes that the human has a power to make
nature conform to an order that is of his own making. His assumptions about the ruling
power of "custom" lead him to say, "Force maketh nature more violent in the return;
doctrine and discourse maketh nature less opportune; but custom only doth alter and
subdue nature.,,25 He continues, "There is no trusting to the force of nature nor to the
bravery of words, except it be corroborate by custom.,,26 Thus, it is through the human's
superior power to make nature conform to custom, be it the nature in man or that which is
formed and apportioned in a garden, that enables the human to take his proper place as
lord and master over nature. This interpretation rests upon the assumption that there is a
radical division between man and nature, wherein nature is a wild force that can be
brought under subjugation to the will of the human, if the human chooses to establish his
authority over it through his cultivation. This interprets the activity of engaging and
representing nature to be at the disposal of human will, but as we have seen, this
interpretation remains fixated on the power of the human to cause an effect and thus,
cannot comprehend that which is truly essential in technical revealing.
25 Francis Bacon, "Of Nature in Men" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996),417.
26 Francis Bacon, "Of Custom and Education" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 418.
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If we do not allow ourselves to be satisfied with these common assumptions about
the relation of intelligibility, man and nature, we are able to see that this is not what
Lovitt intends in this statement. He continues this discussion of the role of man in
technical production by describing man as the one who has the power to be responsive to
that which calls him to bring forth (Hervorbringen) that which is in need of this human
responsiveness for its coming to presence.
Thus man, through his knowing that is doing, creates something new out beyond what is already
given. In doing so he allows the Being of whatever is to become genuine appearing, not
obscuring, confusing semblance. Man in the power of his knowing confronts reality in the power
of its Being and through his creating disposes it anew. Here man does not in any sense master
Being from outside itself. Man is a being in Being. His knowing and Being belong together as
one, in such a way that in and through that knowing, which brings forth works, Being is
accomplishing itself.27
This passage asks us to consider how is it that the human is able to accomplish the act of
production, or how is it possible that the human has the power to gather together and set
forth that which is gatherable and settable. How does the human have the power to act as
the causa ejjiciens? The common way of thinking about this ability assumes that this
productive power is a possession of the human from out of his own genius, which is
interpreted as a power that exceeds the brute forces of nature. This is a monstrous
assumption, one that removes us from nature and places us above it as master. Lovitt,
along with Heidegger, does not assume this and instead understands the source of this
uniquely human power to reside outside of the human. This interpretation attempts to
think through how this power is one of reception which finds itself through an
acknowledgment of 'that which calls out to be gathered together and set forth into
appearance' .
Even as Lovitt poses this question in a thought provoking manner, he also places
us into danger for misinterpreting Heidegger's interpretation of techne. Lovitt's
description of the processes of techne over-emphasizes the power that resides with both
the human and beings. According to his account, the technician is the one who has the
power to bring forth a being from out of concealment so that it can "become genuine
27 William Lovitt, "Techne and Technology," 64.
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appearing." This phrasing could lead one to believe that the work of the craftsperson is
arises out of a demand placed upon him by a being, which merely required human techne
for its appearing. In this way, it seems as if the revealing of techne is a power that is in
the possession of the human that can be set to work through the demands of beings. If
this were the case then the technician would gain the power to accomplish his or her work
from nothing more than a cooperation between beings and humans. This emphasis upon
the role of beings within the process of technical revealing rests upon an interpretation of
the Being of beings as residing in physical presencing alone. Thus, the Being of beings is
determined as that which physically endures throughout the movement from concealment
into unconcealment through this poietic revealing.
Heidegger's concern with this interpretation of technical revealing is that it fails
to focus its attention upon the way of revealing itself, choosing instead to tum its
attention only toward that which becomes visible within the productive process. He
stresses the fact that what we are concerning ourselves with in techne is not simply its
productive power, but how it is a way of revealing?8 Therefore, our attention should not
be focused solely upon the human or beings, but these must be allowed to direct us
toward the source from which the gathering power itself arises. When we tum out
attention from the results of the productive processes of techne, we are able to
comprehend that this power lies neither in beings nor in the human, but comes about from
a different source. Heidegger claims that techne is a mode of aletheuein, because he
understands this as a way in which beings are revealed or brought into unconcealment.
While the technician deals with the production of beings, his work, on a more
fundamental level, accomplishes a unique relation to Being which is made possible
through technical revealing.
The difficulty in this thought stems from the fact that this relation can only be
accomplished through a covering over of Being. That which gives this power must
withhold itself so that the human can tum toward beings and deal with them in such a
way that the relation between the human and Being can be accomplished. This
28 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 13.
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withholding makes it appear that Being is not dealt with by the human in technical
revealing. This covering over Heidegger terms the oblivion of Being. This oblivion is
not due to some fault or error on the part of the human, but is that which first affords a
space for technical revealing to be accomplished.29 The human is only able to tum
toward beings and shape them into useful and beautiful designs because technical
revealing, in its essence, is a response to the possibilities that have been offered by Being
by way of its self-concealing.
By withholding itself, Being gives the human the power to deal with beings in
order to shape a world. Since the human is only able to shape this world by passing
through the realm of technical revealing, the human continually comes into relation with
Being through the setting up of this world. The relation between the human and Being is
not necessarily one of knowing on the part of the human, but the human does understand
that the power to reveal is limited by the possibilities that are offered by beings. Thus,
the human that remains attentive to the revealing of techne does not claim authority over
beings, but finds a place for himself in the world by making himself attentive to the limits
of his power. Respect for these limits allow for the continual exercise of this power
through which the human is able to continually accomplish an essential relation to Being.
In and through the revealing of techne the human accomplishes a unique relation
to Being by drawing together and setting forth a produced being. This final product is
'that for the sake of which' the productive process is taken up, but we have seen that only
by tracking how the four ways in which something is gathered together, do we
comprehend how this gathering itself is made possible. Only by following this path of
inquiry to its conclusion can we adequately understand how some thing comes to
presence. Now that we have witnessed how an independent thing comes to presence, we
are able to fully comprehend what an independent thing is; and yet, through this
discussion of the produced thing we have also become attentive to who we are through an
analysis of our relation to this process. Through the analysis of how techne is a way of
revealing we have come to see that the human is but one way, be it an indispensible way,
29 Martin Heidegger, ed. William McNeill, trans. David Farrell Krell, "Introduction to "What is
Metaphysics?" Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),281.
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in which an independent thing comes to presence. In this way of revealing the human
cannot understood as master of the other co-causes, but has an established role to carry
out as the one who is able to accomplish the task of gathering together that which is
gatherable. Through this gathering and setting forth the human takes up those
possibilities found in beings to accomplish a particular relation to Being.
We have learned that technical revealing is not understood essentially when it is
viewed as merely the process of production. What we found was that techne, as a mode
of truth, can only be comprehended if one understands how the manifold aspects of
causality work in unison to bring something to presence and thus, into unconcealment.
Through this consideration we discovered that way of revealing requires the cooperation
of the four causes and that only as each is allowed to take responsibility for its own part
in the revealing does the process unfold successfully. Thus, techne must be understood
as way in which the human is able to take up and execute his unique power to respond to
the possibilities that are offered by the other co-causes. This respons-ibility does not
arise from the human itself, but is made possible through a unique human relation to
Being. As we take up technology as a way of revealing, let us not forget what we have
discovered about ourselves through our discussion of techne. The hope now is that
through the difference between these two ways of revealing something unforeseen might
make its appearance.
In turning to a discussion of this revealing it will be helpful to begin with an
example of technological revealing itself. E-mail correspondence is a technological
revealing that individuals engage on a daily basis. Through this daily engagement e-mail
appears to be a tool that we use for communication. We open our e-mail account in order
to type a quick message to a colleague or friend, which tells them of some news or
important fact that they might be interested in. We may even find upon opening our
account30 that we have received something like this ourselves. These messages are short
and concise, telling the recipient of all the relevant facts that they might need to know for
30 The word "account" is used here not in the traditional sense of the telling or retelling of a tale, but is
translated into the service of the information that is passed and stored up in the transmission of messages.
This "account" does not recover and represent an event, but is a storage facility for that which is storable.
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the completion of their work or to keep friends up dated about our busy life. When we
hit the "send" key the message is instantly directed to whomever it is intended to reach,
no matter what the distance between those who are in communication. This
correspondence is carried out thanks to the revealing made possible by technology, but
what is actually going on when we engage it? How is it able to accomplish this
wondrous feat of conquering any distance for the sake of communication?
When we communicate via e-mail we see immediate results; the message is sent,
the information is conveyed and we can go on with our business. Friendships can be
sustained over great distances and business can be carried out much more efficiently due
to the power of this technology. This form of communication deals with language in a
very specific way. The revealing that occurs in e-mail correspondence is made possible
in that it reveals something very specific to the recipient at the expense of all other
aspects of discourse that are not encompassed by this specificity. The message itself
allows for the sharing of information. This can only be shared if the individual who types
the message tells the recipient something specific in a direct manner. This way of
speaking is demanded by the medium itself with its reduced screen size reserved for the
body of the message and its surrounding buttons for the commanding the account. While
this space gives room for the composition of a message, all other aspects of discourse
must be set aside, as the look in one's eye as they listen or the tone of one's voice when
she speaks cannot come across in the message. What we do notice in this correspondence
is that as we are given the power to communicate with one another, as those "other
aspects" which are determined unnecessary for the communication of information are set
aside for the sake of the transmission. This setting aside and forgetting is what allows the
medium of technology to accomplish its way of revealing.
When considered as a way of revealing we see that this technology has the power
to make it appear that communication itself is nothing more than an informational
exchange. This is possible because this revealing is accomplished by a simultaneous
concealing. On the one hand, e-mail reveals and makes available information, on the
other, it conceals all other aspects of discourse. By focusing our attention upon that
which is revealed it becomes possible for us to forget about all those other dimensions of
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discourse, and in such a way that we forget that we have forgotten them. This way of
revealing has the uncanny ability to transform our view of language to such an extent that
the medium itself determines what counts as communicable. The danger that arises from
this is that through continued engagement with this form of communication, individuals
run the risk of forgetting the importance of those "other aspects" of communication that
are hidden in e-mail communication. Through this forgetting, individuals are allowed to
insistently focus upon informational exchange instead of allowing communication to be
experienced as an encounter that holds within it the possibility to transcend that which is
merely spoken. Thus, the use of this technology offers efficient communication, but also
brings with it the risk that it could rebound on and transform ordinary language. This
example of the shift that could occur in language, as it threatens to become confined to
the limits established through the medium of e-mail, echoes the shift that was
experienced with regard to the Rhine River in opening passage of Chapter One, in which
the technological view of the river demanded that the majestic beauty of the Rhine be set
aside and forgotten so that it might be referenced it only in terms of its relation to the
electrical station. From these examples it is clear that technology is no mere means, but
must be understood in its uncanny ability to transform and reveal reality as a derivative of
technology itself.
Heidegger claims that this revealing is altogether different from the revealing of
its predecessor. We can glean some of this difference from the previous examples.
Already we are able to see a difference between how humans are able to participate in
each way of revealing. The activity of the carpenter is very different from the e-mail
correspondent. Their difference can be found in the way that each deals with what they
are offered to work with. The carpenter responds to the manifold possibilities that beings
offer to him so as to bring forth a table into appearance, while the instant messager does
not take the manifold aspects of language into account before writing, but determines in
advance what is to count as language within communication itself, so that he can
compose a communicable message. Thus, we see the difference between these two ways
of revealing emerging from out ofthe way in which each allows the world to appear to
the human as something to be worked with.
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Whereas techne was understood as Hervorbringen or the gathering together of the
possibilities manifest in beings for the sake of setting forth of some independent thing
from out ofconcealment, the revealing of technology is described by Heidegger as
Herausfordern or a "challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it
supply energy that can be extracted and stored as SUCh.,,31 This challenging-revealing
differs from the revealing of techne in that through it, the human does not accomplish the
revealing through a responsiveness to the possibilities that are offered by beings, but as
one who demands that nature reveal itself as a nothing more than a source of energy. By
turning toward nature in a way that is different from the craftsperson, the technologist
necessarily carries out his or her "project" differently and thus attains a different "end."
At first glance, this challenging does not seem strange. Heidegger relays for us
how this seems to be precisely what is carried out by older, technical practices of using a
windmill or the sowing ofseeds.32 But these examples remain within the revealing
accorded to techne because they cooperate with the forces of nature, and do so for the
sake of bringing forth a produced end. While both the work of the windmill and the
sowing of seeds do take energy from the earth and put this to use, both are tailored to
nature in such a way as to draw what it offers of itself. The turning of the windmill
remains dependent upon the wind's blowing and seeds will not grow without light and
warmth from the sun. Thus, the success or failure ofthese projects remains tied to the
movement of nature of itself. When the wind blows, water is drawn from the well and
when the sun shines, the crops flourish; and yet, this setting into cooperation of nature, by
the human, in no way demands that the wind blow for the sake of the windmill or that the
sun shine for the growing of crops. Both technical practices set nature to work to
accomplish a bringing forth of water and crops, but the products revealed in these
technical practices can only be accomplished when the craftsperson is becomes attendant
to the possibilities that nature offers for this use.
31 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 14.
32 Ibid., 15.
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The difference between the work of these technai and modem technology rests in
the fact that, for the latter, the extraction of energy from the earth is not accomplished in
order to bring forth some thing from out of concealment, because its activity rests in its
viewing of nature as nothing more than a supplier of energy. Thus, the activity of the
technologist lies in the exposure of energy for the sake of exposure. As we have seen,
this is neither what technical revealing accomplishes nor how it operates, therefore if
technological revealing reveals nature as a source of energy as such, it is undoubtedly
new. In order to understand how and why this new revealing occurs, and is able to occur,
it is necessary to look to how the human's relation to nature fundamentally changes in the
shift from the revealing that is carried out in techne to the revealing of technology. While
the revealing of techne is only possible through a certain respect and responsiveness to
the directives that are offered by beings, the revealing accomplished by technology no
longer responds to beings, but instead "sets upon nature.,,33 The modem technologist
does away with "technical responsiveness" and claims the uncanny power to force nature
to offer itself up as nothing more than a source of energy. This is accomplished by a
passing over of beings, in order to gaze upon the pre-objective energy that nature
conceals within them.
This "passing over" of beings initially sounds hypothetical and ridiculous. We
engage beings all the time. I myself, right now, am pressing my fingers onto this
keyboard and am thus, engaging a being; and yet, it's not simply a question of whether
we deal with beings or not, but it is the way in which we engage them that is at issue
here. We have already discussed a particular way in which the manifold character of
language is passed over for the sake of extracting from it a particular aspect that can be
readily exchanged in e-mail messaging. Thus, by looking past all those "un-useable"
aspects of language, so that it might focus in on and make manifest its one useful aspect,
technological revealing makes language appear as nothing more than 'that which contains
the informational'. By concealing all other aspects of language we are presented with
something that can now be put use and is now understood in terms of serving a purpose.
33 Ibid., 15.
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Language appears as the informational because technology demands that it reveal only
this particular aspect of it, forcing it to appear according to its standards rather than
allowing it to unfold from out of its own manifold possibilities. This challenging demand
placed upon language and it resulting transformation is just one example of how
technology side steps the relations valued in techne, making to possible for the human to
set his gaze upon that which can be stored up and put to some as yet undecided use.
What is so strange about this challenging-revealing is that it does not demand
nature to offer up energy for the sake of some pre-established end, but does so in order to
reveal energy so that it might remain on call for some unknown or unforeseen need. The
absolute unforeseeability of this need determines what technology must seek to reveal
and store up. Since the storage is not carried out due to some real threat that imposes
itself upon humanity, what is determined as "harvestable" is that which is able to stand
ready for the moment in which the human deems it valuable or useful. Therefore, that
which is extracted must be available for any and every use. As we saw in the example of
the carpenter, the telic cause brought both the formal and the material causes into proper
relation to one another by way of the causa efficiens. In that case, the practical end
determined what aspects of those beings should be used by the carpenter, i.e. cherry
wood had to be chosen over pine because the table's need to bear a heavy load required
that a wood of greater density be used. But if use cannot be determined by any real telic
causality, only the most basic forms of use can determine what is to be extracted from
nature. This most basic element of use is found in the pre-objective energy that resides
within nature, i.e. the earth reveals itself as a source of coal which can be converted into
heat, the river a source motion which can be converted into energy by the power plant,
language becomes information that can be quickly exchanged. This "energy" can thus be
stored up and put use for any need that may arise, not like grain in a dispensary, but as
pure potentiality.
And yet, this revealing does not only change its relation to the end that it
"produces," it also changes its self-relation through this as well. Since technology seeks
to reveal only in the challenging forth of energy, the work of this revealing can never
come to an end.
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That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is
transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is in turn, distributed, and what is
distributed is switched about ever anew.34
Thus, technology is a way of revealing that challenges forth. It seeks to establish what it
produces, if this word can still be employed to describe the activity of the challenging, as
'that which stands ready for use'. That which stands ready for use can, in tum, only be
used in such a way as to be reincorporated into the challenging forth of more energy,
because it comes to be comprehensible and thus understood only in terms of the
challenging-revealing of technology. Through this transformation, technology makes it
appear that nature stands before the human not as a realm that offers the possibilities for
the setting up a durable world, but as the site in which one must do battle with the hidden
possibilities of nature, so as to establish a standing reserve that could be put to use at a
moment's notice for the sake of preserving the human's position of power and control
over it.
But how is it possible that the human can come to relate to nature in such a way?
This can only be understood if we take note of how the technologist views his or her role
in the activity oftechnical revealing. The technologist, like the craftsperson, gathers
together that which is gatherable in order to present 'that which is gathered' as something
produced. The difference between these two lies in how each interprets what "nature" is
and how it should be approached. While the craftsperson gathers together that which is
offered up by nature to allow some thing to come to presence, the technologist decides in
advance what is to be gathered, or more precisely what is gatherable, so as to bring to
presence something that can be secured by the human. The former way of revealing
stems from a relation to nature that retains an element of wonder and humility before that
which offers itself up for use. The latter is described as setting upon nature, because the
one who accomplishes technological revealing does not concern himself with
experiencing nature as a source that offers possibilities of a manifold variety, but is
directed only toward that which can be secured and put to use with certainty and
therefore, mastered. It appears now that technological revealing occurs because the
34 Ibid., 16.
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human is able to narrow his or her focus to something in particular within the realm of
nature that can be set upon and ordered. This is possible because the human is able to
decide in advance what is to be taken notice of and thus, determined as real within the
realm ofnature. This narrowing of focus from beings to energy makes it possible for
what is real to no longer be determined as that which comes to presence as an
independent thing, but as that which can be secured as certain for human knowing. Thus,
the real itself comes to be narrowly defined as only that which can be secured by human
knowing.
That which is securable is that which can be known in advance and therefore,
planned for. Heidegger tells us that that which can be known in advance is anything that
falls under the heading of the Greek ta mathemata. When we hear the term
"mathematics," we automatically think of the numerical, but Heidegger turns us toward a
more originary understanding ofmathematics when he tells us, "The essence of the
mathematical, however, is in no way defined in terms of the numerical.,,35 Conversely,
the mathematical comes to be understood in terms of the numerical because numbers
represent "the most striking of the always-already-known." Thus, the kind of knowing
that secures in advance what it is to gather must project for itself a domain in which that
which is to be gathered has already been brought into view as gatherable. According to
the revealing of techne, that which is gatherable is determined by beings themselves and
the work of the craftsperson is accomplished through both a taking notice of these and a
responding to them. This new way of gathering narrows its focus of what is to be
viewed, i.e. the realm of nature, to such an extent that it only views 'that which can be
known in advance' as what is real and thus, considered gatherable. But this gathering can
only be accomplished ifthe technologist has set up, in advance, an open region in which
that which is to be viewed becomes visible. This determination of the real from within
the open region is set up through what Heidegger calls the establishment of a "projected
35 Martin Heidegger, "Age of the World Picture," 57.
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ground-plan." 36 This establishment and the subsequent determination of the real
through the open region which it projects can be witnessed in the revealing of
technology, as it seeks to establish a ground-plan in which that which is securable for
human knowledge becomes visible.
Humans do not encounter energy as such. This encounter or extraction only
becomes possible through a prior determination of what the revealing itself must disclose.
What is to be revealed is determined as that which can be put to use, but this usefulness
itself cannot be in regards to anything specific, because it must satisfy any and all needs
that may arise. Unlike the possibilities offered by beings, energy is determined as that
which can stand ready to serve any purpose at any time and can be depended upon, with
certainty, to serve in the way that it is commanded. Thus, the technological gaze narrows
its view of the real to the level of this pre-objective energy, because the revealing itself
has detennined in advance that this energy is what must be sought.
This "narrowed gaze" first makes its appearance according to Heidegger in the
rise of modem physics.37 The formulation of this science is the first instance in which we
are able to see the human's ordering attitude and behavior manifesting itself. This
attitude shows itself in and through the establishment of this science as it determines the
region through which the real is to be viewed as securable and orderable.
Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, sets up nature to exhibit itself as a coherence of
forces calculable in advance, it therefore orders its experiments precisely for the purpose ofasking
whether and how nature reports itself when set up in this way.38
Thus, we see that this science approaches nature in a way that makes it reveal itself it in
terms of calculable forces, so as to free them up so that they might be ordered; and yet,
this entrapping of nature is not reserved for modem physics alone, as Heidegger attributes
36 "Through the projection of the ground-plan and the prescribing ofrigor, procedure secures for itself,
within the realm ofbeing, its sphere of objects." Ibid., 59.
37 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 21.
38 Ibid., 21.
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this operation which seeks to represent nature in tenns of its calculability according to a
projected ground plan as the foundation of all the modem sciences.39
The rise of modem physics makes possible a profound transfonnation of relation
between humanity and the world. By setting up nature to reveal itself as a "coherence of
forces" this science allows humans to view nature as nothing more that this coherence,
making it possible to set upon these alone. By setting upon ta mathemata, modem
physics is able to take the view that all natural bodies are essentially of the same kind.
Through this reduction, beings now appear as nothing more than the hidden forces within
them. Drew Leder describes this reduction in the following,
The object is left as only an exhibitor of quantity, losing the innate qualities and teleologies that
set it apart from others. In the drive to achieve universal characterization and explanation, modem
physics leaves a uniform world in which the totality of things manifest themselves in but one
way.40
Through this shift from an inquiry into beings themselves to the forces that are hidden
within them, the modem sciences gain access to that which makes possible their
specialized investigations. One could assume that this shift in the human-worldly
relations causes the rise of modem technology, but Heidegger tells us that this shift was
not detennined or decided by any scientist.41 Since the human can never decide what is
to be revealed in a revealing, it does not belong to the human to decide that nature will
show itself as a source of energy. Heidegger tells us the modem physics challenges
nature to exhibit itself in such a way in the seventeenth century because this is the
historical moment in which the challenge of Enframing becomes felt and therefore makes
this transfonnation possible.42 Thus, it is modem technology, which appears
39 "Entrapping representation, which secures everything in that objectness which is thus capable of being
followed out, is the fundamental characteristic of the representing through which modem science
corresponds to the real." Martin Heidegger, trans. William Lovitt, "Science and Reflection," The Question
Concerning Technology (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1977), 168.
40 Drew Leder, "Heidegger on Modem Technology and Science," Philosophy Today 29 (Fall 1985): 250.
41 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 23.
42 "The essence of science is rendered necessary by the presencing of what presences at the moment when
presencing sets itself forth into the objectness of the real." Ibid., 168.
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chronologically later but is historically earlier, that reigns within and makes possible the
appearance of modem physics.
Thus, it is technology that gives rise to the possibility for the sciences to take up
this modem view of nature, allowing for their ordering-revealing to continue without
interruption. By setting upon energy, the human need not look to beings for pre-existing
possibilities for revealing, but need only tum toward the standing-reserve to satisfy
whatever need may arise for him. For example, now instead of having to seek out a piece
of wood that suits his needs, a carpenter need only go to the store where he can secure a
piece of reliable wood in the form of particle board. This is much more efficient because
this "wood," composed of compacted wood fibers, is produced for the sake of having a
precise density. By focusing on the aspect of the wood that can be manipulated with
certainty, one no longer needs to seek out large or small, dense or light pieces of wood
for the accomplishment of work, because we now have the power to force it into a form
that will suit any purpose. By securing that which is securable in wood, we are no longer
dependent upon a particular tree's coming to presence, in the sense ofpoiesis, for the
securement of a piece of wood that we might need for a project. Due to the power of
technological revealing we now have the power to extract the useful aspect of wood
products as such and set it to work to make our own "wood." This man-ipulating
seemingly frees us from the limits of nature, so that we can go about our busi-ness free
from any interruption.
Lovitt describes the narrow view that makes technological revealing possible
similarly by saying:
Thus science, as a knowing, does not confront reality in the full power of its happening. Rather it
directs its attention toward the real as possessed of objectness that lets it stand forth as a network
of calculable causes and effects. As theory, science so brings the real before its observation as to
assure its appearing in this way.43
That which is gatherable is no longer experienced as 'that which is offered up by nature'
in its lived aspect, but is now viewed as that which can be known and thus secured in
advance. Lovitt describes this entrapping as a setting upon of the "objectness" of beings
43 William Lovitt, "Techne and Technology," 67.
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which seeks to set up only the "raw material aspect" of beings, so that the real comes to
be recognized only as ta mathemata and thus, orderable. This interpretation of reality
changes the way in which causality itself is understood. It can no longer be experienced
in its manifold character, but has been reduced to the shifting and organizing of that
which is organizable.44 This means that humanity has established what is to appear as real
by projecting a demand upon nature which transforms it into an object-domain. The real
now appears only as that which can be experienced in its objectness. Thus, the river
really is nothing more than a source of motion for the power plant and wood is a source
of material for construction.
When the human brings her attention only to those things that have been
determined real from out of the open region established through the projected ground-
plan of technological revealing, she opens a space in which she is able to view nature
only in terms that make possible its planning for its securement. When this is
accomplished all other ways of revealing fall into oblivion, as this new and singular task
of transforming nature demands that beings are not to be experienced in their being. This
tum away from nature, in its self-showing, toward a single aspect of it, i.e. that which can
be made useful for the human, necessarily results in nature's appearing as nothing more
than raw material for human consumption, allowing for humanity to assume the supposed
role of master over nature. Thus, man seems to encounter only himself, in the fact that
everything now appears to be either of his making, or for his use.45
This mode of revealing does not seek to establish a finished product, because it
takes as its end the securement of energy for the sake of attaining more energy.
Heidegger uses the German term Bestand to describe "that which is produced through
technological revealing." Lovitt describes this term as standing in stark contrast to the
term Gegenstand that is used to describe the products of techne by saying,
44 "Causality now displays neither the character of occasioning that brings forth nor the nature of the causa
efficiens, let alone that of the causa formalis. It seems as though causality is shrinking into a reporting--
reporting challenged forth--of standing -reserves that must be guaranteed either simultaneously or in
sequence." Ibid,,23.
45 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 27.
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Bestand denotes a store or supply as "standing-by." The word also carries the connotations of the
verb bestehen, with its dual meaning of to last and undergo. Heidegger intends that it make us
think of a ready-reserve-that-endures.46
When nature is no longer interpreted in terms that allow it to stand in accordance with its
own self-showing, in terms ofpoiesis, 47over and against the human, but is only viewed
as a source of energy or as standing-reserve, nature can no longer give directives to the
human in the way that it previously did to the technician. As humanity removes itself
from the directives offered by nature, it directs itself more fully toward the "standing-
reserve." This reserve does not hold value in-itself, but is that which can be put to use for
the establishment of more energy; thus, that which has been gathered and secured can no
longer stand over and against the human as an object, while we are left with "only a vast
pool of stable reserves.,,48
We are surrounded by this world-view and with each passing day the forces of
nature are mastered and converted into energy in such a way as to make any other view
of them impossible. I will offer two examples in which this has become most apparent.
What they will show is that even as we are surrounded by and carry out these activities,
we are not fully aware of what we are accomplishing. The first example in which our
desire to order the forces of nature to make them useful for us is the furtherance of the
genetic modification of food. This common practice challenges the foods we eat to yield
maximum output. A concrete example of this challenging forth can be seen in the genetic
modification of animals, in which scientists challenge the body of an animal to grow in a
certain ways that ensures a greater yield in its "products." Scientists have the power to
modify the body of a cow to grow a greater body mass, introduce foreign DNA into the
body of a pig to ensure that their bodies remain resistant to the harsh environment
encountered in its "storage facility" and have the ability to tinker with the immune
systems of "modified" animals to ensure disease resistance.49 It is conceivable that in the
46 William Lovitt, "A Gesprach with Heidegger on Technology," Man and World 6 (1973): 50.
47 Poiesis includes the revealing of techne.
48 Ibid., 50.
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future, they will attain the power and desire to produce animals with more limbs, so as to
yield a greater harvest at the least expense.
Following along from our previous discussion, is it so far-fetched to assume that
when we appropriate the body of the animal for our use, we see it as nothing more than a
convergence of forces that has the potential to be secured and thus, exploited for human
consumption? If the animal is thought of only in these terms, it can no longer be seen as
a living whole, or a creature that possesses inherent integrity in-itself. When we
approach the animal as a convergence of forces and nothing more, we no longer see the
animal as an animal, or as living, but as 'that which can be altered' in order to suit our
own desires. This is clearly the case, as the quality of life for the animal or the
consequences of the genetic mutations that we impose upon it are not a concern, nor can
they become a concern for us, as the entire project of genetic modification takes as its end
the securement of the greatest yield in its product. Here we see that life itself escapes the
view of this projected domain of scientific inquiry.
This "consumption" of animals is a far cry from that of the predator who seeks
out its evening meal. The work of the technician demonstrates how humans have gained
access to a power that allows us to impose human constructs upon nature. The power of
this imposition is so great that it now appears that nature itself does not appear according
to its own power of self-showing, but that it is now subject to the demands of the human.
Only from this perspective are we able to witness the wonderful and monstrous power
found in technical revealing!
The second example that I would like to explore is even more amazing in the fact
that our current age now seeks to appropriate the sun itself as a source of energy. The
push toward "green energy" is so great that no one is pausing to think through how this
development might affect our relation to that which offers illumination to all life. Will
we come to relate to the sun in the same manner that we do the body of animals? As we
seek to secure the sun as a source of energy for human consumption, is it possible that we
may someday make that which remains radically incommensurate appear as nothing
49 McGourty, Christine. "GM Meat '10 Years Away"'. BBC News. 21 May, 2001.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/tech/1338704.stm.
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more than something to be mani-pulated by the cunning human? The drive toward
harnessing the sun for its energy has already begun in the race toward "green energy" and
while the solar energy movement carries with it the promise to free the world from its
dependence upon petroleum, it also harbors within it the danger to close us off from an
experience of the sun as an entity of wonder and power in its own right.
How then has this human power become possible? How has nature come to
reveal itself as nothing more than something at human disposal? By bringing our
attention to the current relation between the human and nature we are now prepared to
fully experience how technology is "a way of revealing." So far we have discussed how
the power to set up an object-domain that makes viewable nature as the objective, or
orderable, is a power that appears to be a possession of the human; and yet, just as in the
case of the revealing of techne, technological revealing is not a possession that belongs to
the human in the sense of ownership, but is a way in which the human is called forth to
reveal the Being of beings. "Though man may treat nature as a realm of his own
representation, (Vorstellung), and sets traps for her (Nachstellen) he is already claimed by
a way ofrevealment."so This claim is named by Heidegger as Ge-stell, or "Enframing".
The unconcealment of the unconcealed has already come to pass whenever it calls man forth into
the modes ofrevealing allotted to him. When man, in his way, from within unconcealment reveals
that which presences, he merely responds to the call of unconcealment, even when he contradicts
it. Thus when man, investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own conceiving, he
has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an
object ofresearch... 51
Just as we saw in the revealing oftechne, it does not belong to the human to determine
the conditions of revealing. The craftsperson does not decide what the co-causes are or
what his role will be in and through that revealing; and yet, this is not to say that the
human does not participate in and make manifest the accomplishment of the revealing.
What is important to note is that the revealing of techne depends upon the human to plays
his established role properly within the revealing itself. Analogously, the establishment
of the object-domain, from out of which the real is secured, cannot be understood as
50 William Lovitt, "A Gesprach With Heidegger," 52.
51 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 19.
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being derived from any human power, because the human cannot make visible or
determinate anything which did not already reside in nature in a potential state. Like the
causa efficiens in the revealing of techne, the technologist deals with nature in a way that
is given to him as a possibility to reveal that which can be revealed. This is not
accomplished because energy calls out to the human for extraction, but this setting upon
accomplishes the challenge that is set forth in Enframing. Thus, the human does not
command Enframing, but is always already responding to it, when he brings nature into
view in the form of energy. This ability cannot be understood as either arising from
nature or the human, but must be understood as a response to a claim that is made upon
the human to reveal the Being of beings in this way.
Up until now the challenging forth of nature has been understood as an activity
that the human takes up out of an all too human desire to become the lord of the earth.
Within this inquiry the technologist has been described as one who does not take his
directives from nature, but accomplishes technological revealing by choosing these
directives for himself from out of a projected clearing of beings. What we have
discovered is that, while it is true that the human is responsible for determining the real
from out of a narrow projection of what counts as a being, it is not the case that the
human carries out this task through a denial of nature. Conversely, if the essence of
technology is nothing technological, but encompassed in what Heidegger has set forth as
Enframing, we see that the human takes up this domineering relation to nature, not due to
any human willing, but from the demands set forth by Enframing itself.
Enframing is the gathering together that belongs to the setting-upon which sets upon man and puts
him in position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. As the one who is
challenged forth in this way, man stands within the essential realm of Enframing.52
This perspective shows us that it is the human who has been challenged by Enframing to
set nature up in such a way that the real is able to reveal itself as standing-reserve. Just as
in the case of the revealing enacted by techne, the human can never take responsibility for
that which reveals itself so as to be gathered. Even as the human who reveals according
to the directives of technological revealing plays a part in that revealing, it has become
52 Ibid., 24.
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apparent that the technologist can only carry out this task because nature has always
already contained within it the possibility to be viewed and gathered as such. Thus, the
gathering that is carried out through technology can only be understood essentially when
we come to see the role in which the human takes up with regard to the commands set
forth by Enframing.
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CHAPTER IV
TECHNOLOGY: THE ANlBIGUOUS ESSENCE
"There are, then, two kinds ofthinking, each justified and needed in its own way: calculative
thinking and meditative thinking. "-Martin Heidegger, Memorial Address
It seems as if our understanding of Enframing as the challenging-revealing that
sets the human upon nature should be sufficient for us to fully understand the essence of
technology, but Heidegger does not end his investigation with simply pointing out the
distinctions between technical and technological ways of revealing. To stop at this point
in the discussion would be to abandon that for the sake of which this inquiry has been
taken Up.53 It is not enough for us to look to what is new in technology. Heidegger
brings his attention to this newness not for the sake of witnessing a new phenomenon, but
in order to bring our attention to what is beginning to show itself in the present. The
concern with technology is not how it is different, but how through this difference it
threatens the essence humanity. Heidegger's fear is that this way of revealing has the
unique power to close off the human's relation to that which makes revealing itself
possible through the alienation of the human from the possibility of experiencing the
world anew. If this possibility were closed off, we would no longer be able to experience
ourselves as beings of freedom and thus we would no longer be able to comprehend
ourselves as participants in the revealing of truth. If this closure were to be
accomplished, the human would no longer stand in a free relation to the truth, but become
enslaved to the command of Enframing itself.
The danger that technological revealing poses can only be understood when it is
made clear that it no longer seeks to reveals beings, but concerns itself with the single
53 "The essence of modern technology shows itself in what we call Enframing. But simply to point to this
is still no way to answer the question concerning technology, if to answer means to respond, in the sense of
correspond, to the essence of what is being asked about". Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning
Technology," 23.
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goal of exposing nature as energy. Since this way of revealing deals with the exposure of
energy, when it looks out into the realm of beings it no longer sees beings but interprets
everything in terms of energy. Its only goal is to measure and determine how much use-
value might be extracted from the "material" at hand, so that it might be stored for some
future use. From this we can see that this view of beings narrowly defines reality from
out of what it values as useful or important for its own dealings. While those who oppose
this view might argue that this is a "bad" way to treat beings, as it does not respect the
animal as a living creature, or that all life should be respected due to some intrinsic
worth, this opposition does not recognize what is truly at stake in this new way of
viewing the world. The danger that this revealing carries with it is not exhausted in the
fact that it does not value life. What is more frightening is that it does not think in terms
of life or death at all, because, as it becomes ever increasingly occupied with its own
dealings, it fails to see life in its living!
This fact in itself, while it seems terrible, does not require a state of alarm. There
are many ways to view an object or a problem and this "scientific" approach could be one
conceivable way to view nature. What is so alarming for Heidegger is that technological
revealing threatens to conceal all other ways of revealing, in that it covers over the
possibilities that allow for all other ways of revealing to become manifest. It
accomplishes this through its demand that beings, and the possibilities that they offer of
themselves through their own self-showing, be disregarded in order to make visible only
to that which is orderable within them.54 Through this demand to "look past" beings, the
objective conditions that are needed for technical revealing are no longer visible and thus,
that way of revealing can no longer claim us as an activity to be accomplished.55 The
danger here is not that beings will no longer be revealed in the manner of techne. By
54 "Whereas the Aristotelian world-view recognized inherent potentialities and teleologies in the objects of
the world, the challenging-forth engaged in by the modem technology ascribes no intrinsic integrity to the
thing." Drew Leder, "Heidegger on Modem Technology and Science," Philosophy Today 29 (Fall 1985):
248.
55 Michael E. Zimmerman rightly points to the fact that through this denial of beings, for the sake of
energy, we lose the ability to make important ontological distinctions regarding time, place, things and
people. Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger 's Confrontation with Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1990), 209.
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closing off these possibilities, the human becomes closed off from an experience of
revealing as such, as Enframing makes itself appear as the one way in which the real
comes to presence. Thus, it is not only the Rhine that becomes translated into the terms
set forth by the essence of technology, but the power of the human to participate in and
thus respond to revealing that is also placed into the danger of being translated only into
the terms set forth by Enframing.
Drew Leder points to Enframing's uncanny ability to translate all other modes of
comportment into the service of its systemization thus, making them appear as nothing
more than functionaries to the technological framework.
Technology totally reduces all modes of encountering to that of appropriation. An object revealed
aesthetically need not close off the possibility that it will be seen at another moment as useful, or
as an object of theoretical curiosity. However, the modem technological attitude threatens to
block all other attitudes by assimilating and transforming them. The aesthetic moment becomes
useful as a source of relaxation, or perhaps in creating a commodity for the art market. The
moment of theoretical curiosity becomes useful in its furthering of knowledge, control and careers.
Thus the technological vision totalizes itself to incorporate within it all other modes of relation we
could take to the object.56
Thus, other modes of comportment, aside from technology, are not altogether forgotten,
but their fundamental activities and accomplishments are reinterpreted so that they appear
to be in service to the system established by Enframing. The concern here then is not that
technology "gets rid of art." Under the rule of Enframing the activities of representation
and mimesis are still carried out, but, as Leder points out, these activities are transfigured
in such a way that they can no longer be practiced in and for themselves, or be allowed to
reveal in their own right. Thus, one now joins the local choir because it is relaxing and
takes one's mind off of their troubles. Many praise this participation as constructive and
healthy, but those who choose to sing as a livelihood are often thought of as "chasing a
childhood fantasy" or escaping adult responsibilities through their "art." Rarely are those
who choose to take up the life of an artist treated with praise and respect. Unsurprisingly,
it is only when society recognizes one's art as "unique" or "daring," that the artist is
viewed as someone of praise and accomplishment; and yet, rarely, if ever, does this
56 Drew Leder, "Heidegger on Modem Technology and Science," 247.
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praise touch upon the power of art to open a world, as it focuses upon the ability of the
artist to make something interesting to look at and thus, marketable.
I would like briefly to explore our relationship to the arts in order to clarify how
this transfiguration is accomplished and how it affects our experience of reality. From
Leder's description it is clear that once a technological interpretation is placed upon the
arts, their traditional meaning and accomplishments are set aside and forgotten, while
what remains of them is recognized only through their ability to be subsumed into
ordered usefulness for a "productive" life. Thus, art can no longer be a space in which
the artist is given room to explore and discover himself and the world anew through the
act of mimetic distancing and the setting up of a world, but is an activity that anyone
could take up whenever they wanted to "take their mind off' the stresses of the
boardroom. While art is still valued by the latter, the ends and possibilities that are
opened up through this relation do not extend in the same direction, or accomplish the
same act as that of the former. The work of art, under the rule of Enframing, can no
longer be an exploration into the unknown or unforeseeable, through the setting aside of
common norms and values, but, ironically, comes to be only recognizable through these.
Thus, art can no longer be practiced as a way of exploring the self or the world, which are
always already questionable for the artist, but becomes nothing more than an escape, or
an attempt at removal, from monotonous grind of the all-too-familiar technologically
determined world; and yet, this removal itself always remains in a use-relation to the
system itself, as the escape serves the purpose of allowing a worker some "free time" so
that they might return to work refreshed and ready to be productive. Once art is
experienced only from out of this worldly relation and placed into the service of the ends
set forth by Enframing, it can no longer accomplish its innate potential, but is reduced to
standing in as a functionary to the systematic production of the standing reserve.
Once this reinterpretation and conformity all other modes of relation are revalued
according to the pre-established view set forth by the technological gaze, the regulating
and securing of the standing-reserve can no longer meet any resistance. By forcing out
all other ways of revealing, through re-interpreting them into its service, Enframing
46
covers over its own essential nature, i.e. as a way of revealing. It is this final act of self-
concealing that poses the greatest threat according to Heidegger.
Thus the chalIenging Enframing not only conceals a former way of revealing, bringing-forth, but it
conceals itself and with it That wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth comes to pass.57
If we were placed into a position in which there remained no possibility to come into a
knowing relation to truth, the human would no longer have the power to open itself to
that which reveals itself anew through revealing. Without this openness, humanity would
not have the power to overcome this one way of revealing, nor have the power to return
to any other mode of comportment, but would remain abandoned to endlessly carry out
the challenging revealing of Enframing.
Since this systemization, set into motion by Enframing, does not orient itself
toward a recognizable goal, but only seeks greater levels of organization, humanity is
placed into the precarious position of becoming enslaved to this way of revealing. The
endless "systematic organization of life, and of reality as a whole,,,58 that is demanded by
Enframing, would occlude all other possible avenues of human life and would result in
the most totalizing form of slavery in human history. This closure to all other human
potential would, in effect, put an end to history, as "individuals" would no longer be able
to take up a questioning stance toward the world so as to experience it in its unfolding
processes, because all former ways in which the world could be experienced will have
been translated from out of the essence of technology. Under this rule the world no
longer appears questionable because it appears as nothing more than something to be
conquered. The only task to be accomplished is the ordering up of nature so as to make it
available as standing-reserve.
This one task that Enframing challenges the human to accomplish necessarily
disregards the phenomenal aspect of the world for the sake of focusing in on what has
been pre-established as useful so as to set to work all aspects of reality in the most
efficient way possible. The danger in this tum from the phenomenal aspect of living
57 Martin Heidegger. "The Question Concerning Technology," 27.
58 Miguel de Beistegui, The New Heidegger (London: Continuum, 2005), 103.
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toward production and efficiency is that ethical concerns cannot be taken into care within
a system that values only production for the sake of production. Once the value in daily
activities shifts from striving to live well or within one's proper bounds from out of a
consideration for the well being for others, to only the production of the highest yield,
there can no longer be a limit upon what an individual will do to accomplish the task that
is placed before them. If the task at hand is justified in its usefulness and the supply to
accomplish it is guaranteed, there is no need for reflection upon what it is that one is
doing or why it is that they are doing it, as the ends can be said to justify the means. As
the work within this system no longer serves any human end, but is carried out for the
sake of efficiency and the system, the sole purpose of the work can only be found in the
completion of the task at hand. 59 When the system is allowed to become master over its
workers, all working is able to take on the appearance of being justified as well as
necessary and, at the same time, endless.
When this form of life is allowed to take hold of all avenues of human existence
there will be no need to look forward to the future, nor back to the past, because all
events will be pre-planned, from out the demands of the system that each individual
works to sustain, due to its seemingly ultra-rational organization. For writers such as
Miguel de Beistegui the time in which humanity might offer itself up for this totalizing
enslavement is no longer approaching, but is upon us today.
Man has become his own slave, a working animal that must carry on working in order to produce,
and to produce in order to consume. His will, this very will that constitutes his pride and that he
erects as an instrument of his domination over the whole of the earth, is nothing but the expression
of what Heidegger calls the 'will to will'. Yet this man does not realize that his labour and his will
spin in a vacuum, moving him ever more forcefully from his essence. 60
Those who exist within and perpetuate the system cannot desire or hope for any sort of
change in the "system" of life, as time itself is appears to be determined in advance.
Translated from out of the rule of Enframing, time no longer unfolds onto itself, but is the
59 "The rationality upon which the Ge-stell relies is purely pragmatic, functional, which means that the
exigency of rationality no longer stems from the principle; it is only an instrument serving the efficacity of
the Ge-stell." Michael Haar, The Song ofthe Earth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 83.
60 Ibid., 103.
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measure of the linear space in which work is accomplished. This vacuous activity of
production and consumption consummates itself in the perpetual present, as it turns its
attention ever more intensely to the task at hand, but only so as to move on to the next
task. Through this translation of time each "event" becomes viewed as having no greater
or lesser value than the other, as each serves the system in its own necessary way as a
functionary of the greater whole. No doubt that according to the most totalized vision of
this system, the time of sleep is to be measured in terms of "hours of unconsciousness"
and meals in terms of the "quanta of energy" needed to work. 61 If time is nothing more
than a kind of keeping account of work, it can no longer be seen to bear upon itself,
allowing individuals to believe that all moments are equivalent to one another. One need
not think through one's actions, because they no longer can be understood as having any
real effect, as only a break in the system itself would count as a change in reality. Once
all relations to past and future are severed, which means at the same time ethical
questioning is no longer a possibility, humanity is seemingly left with no recourse to
escape or even see outside of the system.
The danger that is posed in this totalizing system touches upon and severely
constricts all worldly relations and therefore, strikes into all avenues of human life. Still,
the question remains, how is it that the system gets set up? Why would people enter into
a system such as this, while they still have an ability to see outside of it? If one were to
respond that the human is powerless against the challenge of Enframing, the challenge
could no longer be a challenge, but would be a determination of the human. This
assumption robs humanity of its freedom to offer itself over to this way of revealing and
it has been established that it is this freedom, which allows the human to open itself up to
the possibilities offered in nature, that allows for these ways of revealing be
accomplished. Therefore, we must discover how is it that even as the human is
challenged to accomplish the goals set forth by Enframing one's ultimate participation is
freely chosen.
61 It would not be outrageous to claim that the U.S.'s increasing dependence upon both coffee and
prescription sleep-aids is not an effect of any economic necessity, but are symptoms of a much greater shift
toward this technologically oriented interpretation of life itself.
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Dominique Janicaud, like De Beistegui, describes the danger of technological
revealing in terms of its ability to enslave the human race. But while De Beistegui claims
that this organization is fueled by an "artificial creation of needs and desires,,,62
Janicaud's analysis looks specifically to the desire to produce and consume, in order to
determine whether this is in fact established arbitrarily and according human caprice, or
the artificial needs are themselves orderly. He claims that the drive toward this slavish
state is carried out for the sake of attaining humanity's own lofty ideal of a "better
future," one in which the chaos oflife is settled into order.63 It is not greed or appetite
that limits the range of human action into ordering, but humanity's desire to create an
anxiety-free future that allows for this enslavement to one's goals. What is striking about
this "better future" is how differently it presents itself from the better future that is sought
through models that take ethical considerations into care. The "better" future, determined
by the system, does concern itself or seek to orient itself toward the enrichment of the
human experience for the sake of more meaningful human relations, because this is not a
possibility for it. The future is only envisioned from the perspective of the system, which
rests upon ideals that value order and progress, not quality of life, and thus interprets
what is "better" for human life from out of these. Therefore, the better future is one in
which humanity is ordered into the most efficient system possible.
Janicaud offers us insight into the way in which this systematization actually takes
hold of people in societies most effectively through its transformation oflanguage,
claiming that the narrow focus upon the attainment of a single goal is accomplished
through the limitations placed on "acceptable discourse" in a technological society.64
Recourse to the power of language is not a new theme in philosophy today, but what is
striking about his description of "techno-discourse" does not lie in its description of what
62 Miguel de Beistegui, The New Heidegger, 103.
63 Dominique Janicaud, trans. Peg Birmingham and Elizabeth Birmingham, Powers ofthe Rational
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 63.
64 "This encompassing technicism is composed of a large margin of passivity; it allows the operation of
'circuits' of technological networks; it accepts the 'functioning' of preconditioned frameworks; it
welcomes gadgets and innovations which move 'in the direction of progress'; it wraps it all in a silence that
is indifferent to everything not 'technologically viable'." Ibid., 62.
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this type of speech is able to say, but what it is able to keep from entering into speech.
He makes the reader attentive to the fact that technological revealing can only be fully
accomplished, or be actualized as a totalizing system, if it is able to conceal the
questionability of its activity. The silencing-concealing allows technology to appear as
the only way in which the real is revealed by making an appeal to "natural
consciousness" and its fascination with effects and results.
Modem technology essentially seeks to be productive ofeffects. If it reaches its goal, which is its
proper end, the powerlessness of the discourse and the obscurity surrounding the ultimate end of
the techno-scientific process are oflittle importance.65
By effecting results, technological advancements do two things: produce a desired end
and obscure any sort of possible need for consideration of the value of the process as a
whole. Thus, the results of technological advancements seem to justify its activity, or in
other words, make the process appear to be self-explanatory. Who would question the
awesome power that science wields over the material at its disposal; and yet, what
Janicaud, along with Heidegger, draw our attention to is the fact that this obsession with
the power of effecting and goal setting obscures 'that which makes the process itself
possible' and does so in such a way that it becomes impossible to see that the process is
carrying out an obfuscation.66
The technological system is not entered into due to some escapist desire. The
illusion that technological advancement puts forth, in its accomplishments of human
desires, encourages individuals to dedicate themselves to "advancement as such" because
these accomplishments make it comprehensible that technology could be put to use for
the sake of some "greater end." With all of its success, it seems as if technology should
be able to accomplish any goal that is placed before it, at the same time, it also appears
that if a desired goal remains unattained, this is not due to a failure on the part of
technology, but due to humanity's lack of focus and determination to put it to good use.
Thus, technological accomplishments offer the hope that humanity could "produce" a
65 Ibid., 62.
66 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 26.
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better future through its own determination and it is this hope that allows individuals to
organize themselves under the common goal of systematization.
What Janicaud points to is that the highest goal that individuals are able to set for
themselves within the system is progress for the sake of a better future. This goal seeks
the highest possible aims within an organizational system because it does not aim at the
self-serving desires of an individual entity, but seeks to organize for the sake of endless
organization into the future. With the establishment of this goal one is able to carry out
the task demanded by the system endlessly, with the dream that through their hard work
something greater than themselves will be accomplished. Thus, we find ourselves
advancing the research of atomic energy. While this energy brings with it the power to
extinguish not only the human race itself, but all life on Earth as such, it also is
understood as holding within it the promise of a better future. This better future is one in
which there is enough energy for all. Through this busyness, the burden of life is taken
from the shoulders of the worker, with the excuse that it has been done for the sake of
"the future."
But doesn't this setting aside of the burden of human life accomplish precisely the
opposite of what it hopes to attain? When individuals tum toward specialized tasks in
order to unify under this common goal of a better future they close off the possibility for
a future that exists as future and not simply a recurrence of the eternal present. When
individuals sacrifice themselves to the system interpersonal, and therefore intrapersonal,
exchange is lost. Once humans no longer relate to one another, or to themselves, as
unique individuals, but determination themselves according to the standard of "universal
human subject," they bar themselves for ever comprehending that anything may exist
outside of the system. All ties of relation are stripped from the human that have not been
predetermined by Enframing and with this any hope of breaking free from the goal-
oriented system is lost. The human is no longer understood as the being that is
determined from out of its essential relation to truth, but becomes nothing more than a
functionary within the technologically determined system.
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By making its demands appear unquestionable, Enframing establishes its rule and
humanity finds itself willfully submitting. This ominous future is again described by
Janicaud in terms of its silence.
This operation takes place as ifby itself, having no need of being "articulated". Technicism is, by
instinct, silent, one the instructions have been given and the orders passed along-a silent instinct
earned to some degree by the tacit acquiescence of machines. In the most technological society, in
an absolutely closed technical system, only codes would break the silence, as orders would be
received by a perfectly disciplined army. A hyper-technical society wouldfunction and would
remain silent.67
Once technology has gained acceptance as that which has the power to alter human life
for the better, it seems as if it is only a matter of time before it establishes itself as the
new world order. The most terrifying element of this revolution is not found in its
physical brutality towards dissenters, but in its ability to make it appear as if there is not
and could not ever be a position from which one could challenge the fundamental
position.
When viewed from this perspective, is it too far-fetched for one to wonder if those
animals that Aristotle describes as "political," such as bee and ants, have not always
organized themselves in such a fashion? Did they too possess, at one time, the power to
relate to one another in a different, more originary way? Is their "rational" organizing,
merely the after-effect of their inability to come to terms with a more originary freedom?
From this discussion, these questions that would have seemed ridiculous at one time
cannot be dismissed so easily, as they illustrate situations in which living creatures do
operate silently within closed systems. A common response to these questions would be
to claim that humans possess innate qualities that set them apart from these animals. On
the one hand, humans are believed to possess "freedom," whereas these animals do not
have this fundamental trait; a more compelling response would remind us that humans
have the power of speech, and that this is what allows us to remain irreducible to those
creatures who are simply bound by their natures. But Janicaud's work shows us that
through the ordering of the system, language itself becomes unnecessary, and even
counterproductive, among its workers. Accordingly, those within the most totalized
67 Ibid., 63.
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systems no longer speak. Following from this, can we be so sure that the systematic
ordering of these "political" creatures can simply be attributed to "their nature," or is it
possible that are we seeing the results of a pre-human "civilization" which fell prey to,
and remained within, the challenging set forth in Enframing?
This silent systematization appears to be securing a place for itself in the form of
the science of "cybernetics." This science, which seeks to organize all sciences under the
single goal of the systematization of the real,68 seems to be the actualization of the
supreme danger, through which the most recent, and seemingly final, stage in this human
forfeiture of freedom is being accomplished. Cybernetics focuses its attention of the use
and exchange of "information. ,,69 This exchange is what would make possible Janicaud's
"hyper-technical society," as it seeks to control the work that is accomplished within the
system through a closed-circuit exchange of information. This circular exchange is
accomplished through messages that are sent to a process which receives an order, this
receiver then accomplishes its task by responding back to the process that commands it.
This process of exchange has the character of "feedback."70 Within this model of
communication the only thing that is valued is the exchange. This "exchange" is not one
that seeks to discover something that may be unknown, and thus questions. The
communication that is carried in cybernetic exchange is one of command. This
information that is sent to the receiver is an order and the receiver responds to the
programmer or operator by carrying out the command that is given. Thus, this type of
communication is only able to produce pre-established results. "Circularity-and self-
regulation-are the defining characteristics of the world that cybernetics projects.,,7! It
does not and cannot seek to discover anything new through the exchange, as this is not its
68 "It [cybernetics] constitutes the very matrix of techno-science in that it designates an epistemological
project oriented towards operational control more than fundamental research aimed at understanding a
given phenomena" Ibid., 107.
69 See Chapter Three "Ways of Revealing: Techne and Technology" for a discussion of how the technology
that operates through messaging reduces language to information.
70 Miguel de Beistegui, The New Heidegger, 104.
71 Ibid., 104.
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goal and the only time in which this communication could receive something other than
that which has been commanded is when the receiver of information is unable to
accomplish the task that it has been given. In a perfect system this denial would never
come in the form of a refusal, but in the form of a "technical difficulty" or malfunction.
So we see here the danger that technological revealing carries with it in its ability
to make itself appear as the only way in which the real is revealed to us and a concrete
way in which this danger not only threatens us but is actually manifesting itselftoday in
the form of cybernetics. De Beistegui and Janicaud, as heirs to Heidegger's thinking, are
able to show how the current age has moved beyond systematization in the form of the
securement of energy for human consumption, toward an emphasis on the exchange of
information. This move from energy to information illustrates the hyper-reality that the
human seeks to dwell within. Through the increase in the cybernetic system, human
work has begun to tum away from direct extraction setting up of a standing-reserve of
energy, because within this system the securing of energy need only be accomplished
through talk of securing. This drive toward systematization does not need to secure
energy through actual work, but rests assured, so thoroughly confident in its methods and
power to control, that it need only to establish sentinels, across the globe, for this
securement. These executors of systematic planning would not stand ready to work, but
would stand ready to immediately execute the commands set down by the operator if the
need for extraction should be determined. This global, cybernetic system would establish
itself in such a way that no force on earth could threaten its reign. It would hold the very
forces of nature at its finger-tips and with a single command could destroy entire nations,
continents, and even the earth itself.
This danger, the invisible enslavement to our own circular planning, is what we
are exposed to in Enframing and is what Heidegger asks us to become aware of when he
tells us,
---------------_.-----------
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We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life
and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For
precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny
change in the world moves upon us.72
The supreme danger does not arrive in the form of a foreign force that threatens human
life. This danger arrives through humanity itself as we open ourselves to the threat of the
"annihilation of the human essence." If Enframing were to completely take hold of
human life, it would accomplish the closure of the human's relation to the truth and thus,
transform humans into those animals that labor for the system, without freedom or speech
to offer them any chance of escape. For Heidegger, "the essence of man is not given to
him as a nature. He has it by being. He can gain or lose it.',73 Thus, we are reminded
that through this obsessive drive toward a totalizing organizational system in which "the
possible would become identical to the real,,74the human is placed into danger due to his
or her own actions; and yet, it is necessary to remind ourselves of how essential human
activities arise as possibilities. Even as we concern ourselves with power that
technological revealing has to cover over all other ways in which the truth is revealed and
the danger that this poses to the human essence, it is necessary to recall that technology is
still a revealing and thus, remains a way in which the human comes to stand in relation to
truth.
Enframing challenges the human to set upon nature in such a way so that it can be
reckoned up and ordered. This challenge requires that the human take a particular stance
with regard what appears as real within the realm of nature. This is accomplished
through a narrowing of the view by which nature and the real is apprehended or made
comprehensible. Thus, the human does carry out this project of viewing nature so as to
discern that which can be ordered, but what must not be forgotten is that it is in no way
within the power of the human to determine the manner of revealing or what is revealed
through it. The human cannot make nature appear as energy if it were not already a
72 Martin Heidegger, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, "Memorial Address," Discourse on
Thinking (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1959), 52.
73 Michael Haar, The Song o/the Earth, 87.
74 Ibid., 87.
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possibility for nature to appear in this way. From this perspective, it is clear that there is
an aspect of revealing itself that technology can neither reveal nor bring under its
command, as it rests upon this for its ability to reveal as such.
This inability of technology to does not stem from some failure in its ability to
order. Technology necessarily relies upon something that remains excessive to what is
revealed through it. In his essay "Science and Reflection," Heidegger calls this elusive
and enigmatic character "that which cannot be gotten around.,,75 Here he points to the
fact that it does not belong to the individual sciences to inquire into the ground of their
specific object domain because this does not fall within the power of the revealing that
the sciences operate under. He tells us,
Accordingly, it would have to be expected that science itself could find and present within itself
that which is not to be gotten around, and could define it as such. But it is precisely this that does
not come about, and indeed because this is impossible.. .If the sciences themselves should at any
time be able to fmd at hand in any of themselves what is not to be gotten around of which we are
speaking, they would have before all else to be in a position to conceive and represent their own
essence. But they are never in a position to do this.76
Thus, Heidegger acknowledges that technological revealing carries within it an internal
limit and in its very nature both conceals and reveals this. Enframing orders and
challenges so as to set all aspects of reality into place within its pre-established order; and
yet, even as it orders and challenges endlessly, there will always remain that which
cannot be made to stand in terms set forth by this revealing. Thus, through the particular
example of the sciences we see that it cannot ever belong to this way of revealing to
reveal that which grounds it.77
This limit that technological revealing confronts cannot be interpreted as a failure
of the revealing itself, but must be understood as disclosive of the ground upon which this
revealing rests. If it is not witnessed simply as a limitation of the human mind, the limits
75 Martin Heidegger, "Science and Reflection," 175.
76 Ibid., 176.
77 Aristotle himself acknowledges this limit as belonging to the sciences in the Physics when he tell us,
"For just as it no longer belongs to the geometer to give an account to someone who rejects his starting
points, but either to a different science or one common to all knowledge, so it is with the one considering
origins". Aristotle, Physics, Book I, Ch. 2, In. 185a.
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of science can be disclosive of something that remains operative within technological
revealing, but can never be appropriated by it. If we wish to respond that which claims
us from out of the failure of scientific knowing, it has been made clear that we cannot
approach it in the manner that science approaches an object of inquiry, as "that which
cannot be gotten around" must be granted a different kind attention. Heidegger tells us
"reflection" is the only way in which we might bring ourselves into a knowing
relationship with what cannot be appropriated through scientific inquiry.78 Reflection, or
meditative thinking, is a thinking that is not commanded by technological revealing, but
also does not simply abandon it. It is exercised in relation to technological revealing.
Instead of remaining captivated by the efficiency of technological revealing, this thinking
questions into the ground that makes the revealing possible. In order to do this, the
human gaze must be freed up from its focus on beings and energy so that it might
question into the ground which makes revealing itself possible. In doing this it is allowed
to ponder not only what is revealed through the revealing, but also the way in which this
is revealed. Thus, reflection must be able to tum itself back onto itself, not seeking to
command but to experience itself anew, so as to witness that which has been previously
passed over and grounds revealing as such.
78 Martin Heidegger, "Science and Reflection," 180.
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CHAPTER V
THE TRUTH OF TECHNOLOGY
"We learn nothing with greater difficulty than to freely use the national. "
--Friedrich Holderlin, Letter to Bohlendorff
Our concern has been to comprehend the essence of technology. If we recall the
words of Aristotle that were put forth in Chapter Two, we will be reminded that this work
seeks to understand how technology stands in relation to its source or cause so that we
might understand how it has arisen from both the perspective in which it appears to us
and how it appears simply. In making our first approach, it was shown that the
technological devises that we commonly think of as technology cannot ever fully
encompass its essence, because the essence of technology is not a mere means, but is a
mode of truth. This required that we look past these devices, in order to tum toward an
analysis of causality. This turn toward causality as such has allowed us to investigate the
different ways of revealing according to how causality operates within them.79 Through
this analysis we have discovered how the human cooperates within these differing modes
of truth only by coming into accord with the demands set forth by the mode of truth itself.
Thus, we have discovered that the human never determines what the truth reveals or how
he is to participate in the revealing, but accomplishes that which is set forth by the
revealing itself. While the human is witnessed as the one who is receptive to the
demands set forth by the revealing, this does not mean that the revealing is accomplished
above or without the human, because even as the human does not rule over or determine
the truth, the human intimately belongs to this movement as the one who is able to
respond to and unfold it into its completion.
79 As we have seen, causality operates differently within each way of revealing. Within the revealing of
techne causality operated as the drawing together of the four-fold causes so as to induce a being to come
into unconcealment, while in technological revealing causality was described as a reporting.
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In focusing our attention upon causality as such we considered these different
ways of revealing, in order to inquire into how causality operates differently within each.
But we still need to discuss how the ways ofrevealing themselves become manifest. By
following our investigation along the way that has been possible for us we have arrived at
the question of what a way of truth is as such. But don't we hear in the word aletheia the
truth oftruth? Haven't we been working under the belief that truth is unconcealment?
Doesn't unconcealment encompass what truth itself is? While our investigation has
rested upon an understanding of truth as unconcealment, we have not yet fully understood
the movement of arising from concealment into unconcealment to its fullest extent. As
our investigation into cause has rested upon our belief in different modes of truth, we
have been working all along under the assumption that there are differing modes of truth.
Thus, if we allow ourselves to reflect back upon our investigation, we are able to see that
the truth reveals itself in different ways. Truth itself is manifold. Thus, if we are to fully
comprehend the truth, we cannot remain satisfied with this tentative distinction between
'the concealed' and 'the unconcealed,' but must continue to investigate into how these
different modes of presencing occur.
This investigation has focused upon what is revealed through the human's
participation in the ways of revealing of techne and technology. Thus far, our attention
has been turned toward that which is revealed, and the part the human plays within this
revealing; and yet, in turning toward these aspect of the revealing we have failed to
adequately question into that which makes the revealing itself possible. In both cases we
relied upon our observations about the various ways in which beings or nature offered
themselves to the human as a source to be encountered and worked with. By orienting
ourselves unquestioningly toward those aspects of beings which are already manifest to
us, we have been thinking through the question concerning technology in a way that
accords with all metaphysical thinking.
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As metaphysics, it is by its very essence excluded from the experience of Being; for it always
represents beings only with an eye to that aspect of them that has already manifested itself as
being. But metaphysics never pays attention to what is concealed itself in this very being insofar
as it became unconcealed.80
In turning toward and questioning what is already visible in the revealing, we too have
passed over the concealing which allows for the coming to presence of beings. In
Chapter Two we began along this way, which seeks to attend to what is concealed in a
being, because it was determined that we could not count ourselves as knowledgeable
about a being unless we had unfolded the cause that had allowed it to come to presence. 81
For this very reason we turned toward an investigation into the four-fold causality that
philosophy has historically rested its investigations upon. But, as we are beginning to see
now, it appears that this interpretation of causality itself rests upon something still prior
to it. Thus, if we are to fully comprehend technology as a way of revealing, we must go
back and look more closely to causality itself in order to more fully see what is occurring
in the revealing.
Heidegger tells us that both techne and technology are "ways of revealing." What
does it mean to be a way of revealing? Until now, we have remained satisfied with
describing the activities that occur within these two ways, as the interaction between the
human and those possibilities that are offered to him for the accomplishment ofthe
revealing itself, to suffice for an explanation of the way itself. But it has been shown that
the revealing does not take place in the productive or challenging processes, as the
revealing in techne does not rest in a power of the human to create beings from nothing
or to respond to some demand from beings themselves, and that the challenging forth of
energy in the revealing of technology is only possible because nature hides this securable
aspect within itself prior to any human activity that seeks it out. In both of these ways of
revealing we see that the human is only able to carry out the activity of revealing due to
some prior possibility that allows these to become accessible in such a way.
80 Martin Heidegger, "Introduction to "What is Metaphysics?" 288.
81 Here we determined this to be the manifold cause which induced something to come forth from out of
unconcealment. This was understood to be determined through the cooperation of the four co-causes which
are responsible for particular aspects in the occasioning of a being.
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While it has already been established that the human is the being who is able to
respond to those possibilities that are offered for the revealing to be accomplished, the
question remains, if the directives for the accomplishment of the revealing do not
originate in the human or from beings, how does this revealing become possible?
Heidegger tells us, "Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a way of
revealing.,,82 Since this revealing does not occur beyond all human doing, but requires
his cooperation for its accomplishment, the activity of the human can only be understood
as a response to that which sets him along a way of revealing. Heidegger deems this
setting along a way as "destining" or "Geshick. ,,83 Destiny is that which sends the human
along a way of revealing. This sending guides the human to reveal that which presences
in such a way that is made possible through the sending. Even still, what does it mean to
be a way of revealing and how does this have the power to "send the human along this
way" as a destiny?
Heidegger explicitly asks the question, "What is a way?" in his essay "The Way
to Language." His response to this question is, "The way lets us get somewhere.,,84
Thus, a way of revealing lets us arrive at the revealing that the way allows. But how then
does this happen? How is it that a way of revealing can bring us to reveal the real as
beings or as energy? This "way" that Heidegger speaks of cannot be comprehended if
one simply thinks of it as a path that has been pre-established that the human is
compelled to follow, as this would remove the human from his essence as the being that
is free to respond to that which offers itself to him as a way. Heidegger offers us a
directive for thinking way, not in terms of the pre-established, but as way-making, or as
being the way itself. He uses the term Be-wegen to lend the term "way" its transitive
sense, as in the clearing of a way. "Be-wegen, thought in this transitive sense, no longer
means to merely transport something on a way that is already at hand; rather it means
82 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 25.
83 Ibid., 25.
84 Martin Heidegger, ed. David Ferrell Krell, "The Way to Language," Basic Writings (San Francisco:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1993),413.
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rendering the way to ... in the first place, thus being the way.,,85 Thus, to be a way means
to clear the way through an opening up of the way.
Heidegger's interpretation and employment of "way" is reminiscent of the Greek
term arche, which Aristotle uses to name the origin or cause. This term has a two-fold
sense, in which it means both to begin and also to rule over. In this context, if we think
of a way of truth in terms of being an arche, truth is the origin of the revealing, in that it
clears the way for the revealing that comes to pass, and also guides the revealing to its
completion. Since the human is determined by his freedom, which allows him to come
into relation to this way of revealing, this destiny that is not a fate that compels, but is an
opening up of a passage that the human is called to follow along and carry out. 86
Thus, a way of revealing cannot be determined by any human willing, but must be
understood as the process through which the truth itself becomes manifest and draws the
human into a relation to its manifestation. This requires that we witness the truth not
simply as unconcealment, but as the way-making movement that allows something to
arise from concealment into unconcealment. Heidegger tells us, "All revealing comes out
of the open, goes into the open, and brings into the open.,,87 Thus, the way of revealing
encompasses all the moments that are contained within the revealing and guide it from its
outset. This means that if we are to fully comprehend aletheia, as unconcealment, we
must inquire also into the hidden ground of truth. If the way-making of truth involves all
aspects of the revealing, then we must become attentive to not only what is made
manifest through the revealing, but also how that which comes to presence stands in
relation to its ground, or to that which remains concealed.
This thinking asks us to consider not only the truth of beings but the truth of
Being. This guiding and revealing, that send us along a way of revealing, is
85 Ibid., 418.
86 "To free oneself for a binding directedness is possible only by being free [Freidsein] for what is opened
up [zum Offenbaren-hence also, for what becomes manifest] in an open region." John Sallis, ed. by
Franyois Raffoul and David Pettigrew, "Free Thinking," Heidegger and Practical Philosophy (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2002), 7.
87 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 25.
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accomplished in that Being grants or brings to light certain possibilities that offer
themselves to humans for the carrying out of the revealing, but this opening can only be
accomplished through a through a certain self-concealing. This concealing cannot be
considered a lack, but is that which first affords a space for beings to come into the
open.88 Miguel De Beistegui attributes to this self-concealing the possibility of destiny.
Destiny, for Heidegger, is a sending of being. What characterizes this sending, though, is that it
implicates a certain reserve, an opacity: in sending itself, it also holds itself back. This is what,
following the Greek, Heidegger calls the epoche of truth. The various ways in which the truth
holds itself back determine the various 'epochs' of truth. In manifesting itself the truth also
conceals itself. 89
Through this "holding back" of itself Being opens a space for beings to appear and thus,
the possibility for the human to engage beings as beings; and yet, we have also seen that
beings do not always reveal themselves in the same way. This tells us that Being does
not conceal itself and therefore, reveal beings in only one way. Thus, we see that through
the withholding of Being, beings appear to the human in accordance with the way in
which Being withdraws itself.
This prior withholding is what determines the possibilities that are to be found in
beings by the human. As was determined in Chapter Three, the technician does not
decide how the co-causes are to cooperate, because this is determined by the revealing
itself; likewise, the scientist does not determine that nature can be set up to report itself as
a complex of forces, but does so only because he finds this as a pre-existing possibility in
nature. Therefore, we must understand that the possibilities that the human discovers and
sets to work in the revealing is only possible, because beings themselves come into
unconcealment as the beings that they are only though this prior engagement with that
which conceals. Thus, it is through the withholding of Being, which allows beings to
appear according to the unique epoch of truth, which allows the human to go along a way
88 "All revealing belongs within a harboring and concealing...Freedom is that which conceals in a way that
opens to light." Ibid., 25. This quotation is reminiscent of the saying which tells us that pure light is
equivalent to pure darkness. If Being did not withhold itself so as to limit possibilities, then there would be
nothing for the human to deal with for revealing. There would be infinite possibility and thus, no directive
for some particular thing to be accomplished.
89 Miguel de Beistegui, The New Heidegger, 115.
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of revealing. Through its self-concealing Being sends the human along a way because it
determines what possibilities can manifest themselves within nature and beings, which in
tum determines the range of possibilities that the human can have in coming into relation
with them and thus, accomplish the revealing in the way that is possible.
The clearing of Being, in and through which beings come into unconcealment
determines how they are to appear. Their manner of presencing is never determined by
human dealings, but are offered up for human response. In the revealing of techne beings
offered themselves as entities to be gathered together by the craftsperson and in the
revealing of technology nature offers itself up as energy. The manner ofpresencing that
is made manifest by the open region determines the way in which the worldly relations
between beings, humans and Being come to stand. Epochs of truth determine how the
human is drawn into these relations and opens up the way through which the human can
respond to what is given in order to set up a world.90 In and through this response all
worldly relations are established. This is not a work of human making, but that which is
first afforded by Being, by way of beings, and it is through the appropriate human
responsiveness that a singular order of beings is allowed to come to pass.
We find ourselves in the epoch of truth in which all beings present themselves as
nothing more than a store of energy for human consumption. Since this aspect of beings
is available for human relations, we view beings and nature as nothing more than this.
Energy is something that does not demand respect, as it is merely an inert mass or lifeless
force that serves human need. Thus, beings and nature are not treated with dignity,
because they appear only as something which intrinsically does not require respect, but is
something that only holds value in terns if its use. It is this outward appearance of
beings, as energy, that has set the standard for all worldly relations within this epoch of
truth. But it is clear that beings have not always appeared in this light. During Medieval
times beings appeared not as a convergence of forces or inert matter, but as created
beings. Beings which appear as created encourage humans to relate to them in a certain
90 "World is the ever non-objective to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing
and curse keep us transported into Being." Martin Heidegger, ed. David Ferrell Krell, "The Origin of the
Work of Art," Basic Writings (San Francisco: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 170.
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way. During this epoch, beings could not be handled, dissected and forced into human
use in the ways that they are now, because each being, as a being, had been crafted by the
divine maker and thus, carried with it a portion of the divine grace. When beings are
determined as being allotted a portion of divinity they demand a certain level of respect
in themselves. In this time beings were not viewed as raw material, but as beings worthy
of wonder and praise. Thus, we can see that the way in which beings appear determines
the way in which we, as humans, are able to approach and deal with them.
From this we are able to see that Being withholds itself so that beings can shine
forth in the way that has been allotted to them from Being itself. By looking to different
epochs of truth we are also able to see that Being does not allow for beings to come into
unconcealment always in one way, but that this comes about differently as well.
Therefore, the challenge of Enframing is not a force that has randomly claimed humanity,
which seeks to destroy the earth through some frenzied ordering and challenging; it is the
destiny that belongs to our historical moment. In his essay "Science and Reflection"
Heidegger tells us,
Thus modem science, as the theory of the real, is not anything self-evident. It is neither a mere
construct of man nor something extorted from the real. Quite to the contrary, the essence of
science is rendered necessary by the presencing of what presences at the moment when presencing
sets itself forth into the objectness of the real. This moment remains mysterious, as does every
moment of its kind. It is not only the greatest thoughts that come upon doves' feet; but at any
given time it is the change in the presencing of everything that presences that comes thus-and
before all else. 91
Thus, it is the change in the presencing of that which presences which draws the human
into the claim of destiny. We find ourselves within the time in which the real presences
as that which can be revealed as energy. We do not choose to either succumb or deny the
challenge of Enframing, as we are already claimed by it; and yet, since the revealing
itself requires human cooperation for its accomplishment, this destining requires the
human for its unfolding into accomplishment. As long as we merely respond to beings,
in the way that they offer themselves up as energy, we remain bound to the challenge of
91 Martin Heidegger, "Science and Reflection," 169.
66
Enframing. In doing this we still respond to the call of Being, but in a way that does not
fully embrace the freedom that makes this response possible.
Only when we pause from the challenging-revealing to ask ourselves how worldly
relations between humans and beings are made possible are we able to free ourselves
from the ordering revealing and think it from a difference provenance. Now that we have
determined that it is not beings, but Being, that both opens and makes the way of
revealing, we are able to comprehend how the human stands in relation to the way itself.
Being withholds itself so that beings might offer themselves up to the human for
cooperation in the revealing. In doing this Being holds open the way; and yet, the way
cannot be accomplished as a way unless the human responds to that which is given in a
way that is appropriate to what is offered. Thus, we see that the way is only able to
unfold as a way if the human takes it up and accomplishes it. Only in this light, the one
in which the human is seen as responding to Being and not simply beings, are we able to
see that an order of beings comes to pass through the response of the human to the way
that is opened by Being itself.
When we ask the question of what it means to be a way, we are given the
opportunity to experience ourselves, even everything, anew. This question reconnects us
with our own essence, because it allows us to open ourselves to the freedom that enables
an ordering of beings. This both allows us to partake in the way of revealing that has
been allotted to us, and also gives us the opportunity to comprehend that we are needed in
the unfolding of truth itself. Ge-stell has been witnessed as but one way in which the
truth of Being is revealed; and yet, its challenging claim is what has brought us into this
confrontation with the truth of Being itself. Thus, the way that is cleared by this
revealing is not exhausted in the challenging-revealing of Enframing, but also opens a
way to the way of truth itself.
What are we witness to here and what is becoming manifest to us through this
questioning? As we are no longer simply bound to the way that is set by Ge-stell but are
able to see that it is a mode of truth, we are able ask then, how it stands in relation to
other modes of truth, and thus, how truth stands in relation to itself. This is possible
because the essence of technology is nothing technological, but is the essence of truth
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itself. The question concerning technology asks us to think through the relation between
concealment and unconcealment in such a way that a new relation to the truth becomes
possible. Thus, technology is a way of truth that opens onto the way of truth as such.
This opening onto the way of truth as such cannot be of any human making, but arises
from out of the possibilities that the truth of Being as offered of itself. Thus, this tum
toward the truth as truth has come about from a call to truth from out of itself. We may
choose to respond or to deny this claim, but we remain within this destinal sending all the
same. But it remains to be said how this way has arisen and is coming to meet us.
As a way of truth, technology sends the human along the way of its revealing, but
in doing this to closes the human off from all other ways of revealing. From our
discussion we could assume that technological revealing is but one way among others,
but if it closes us off from any other way, now or in the future, it cannot be counted as
one way among many, as if these ways were to all fall under a single concept of
revealing.92 This way of truth threatens to close us off from an experience of the truth as
such and thus, offers us a new experience of truth. Thus, it is through the challenging-
revealing of technology that the truth itself is able to reveal itself to the human in a way
that is possible for it. Heidegger names this other revealing of technology "the saving
power". He tells us of this power,
For the saving power lets man see and enter into the highest dignity of his essence. This dignity
lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment-and with it, from the first, the concealment3-of
all coming to presence on this earth.94
So it is not only beings and a particular relation to them that is made manifest in
Enframing, but also the play of concealment and unconcealment are brought to light as
well. Thus, technology cannot be thought of as one way of revealing among many, but is
the way in which truth as such is brought to itself. Instead of simply being the way of
truth that threatens to destroy the human essence, technology must also be thought as that
92 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 30.
93 Emphasis mine.
94 Ibid., 32.
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unavoidable way in which we are brought into a proper relation to truth, which means at
the same time ourselves.
Technology is not of our making, but is a destiny of truth. This destiny has
unfolded through the passage of history and we find ourselves at the consummation of
this way of truth as it brings itself to itself through our cooperation. If technology is what
is revealed through this way, this is only because technology has been destined to reveal
itself from the outset, in which the truth revealed itself as the presence of what presences.
Heidegger hints at this destiny on occasion in his writings on technology. Through this,
he gestures toward the idea that history is the occurrence of the singular event of the
unfolding of the truth of Being.
That which was thought and in poetry was sung at the dawn of Greek antiquity is still present
today, present in such a way that its essence, which is still hidden from itself, everywhere comes
to encounter us and approaches us most of all where we least expect it, namely in the rule of
modern technology, which is thoroughly foreign to the ancient world, yet nevertheless has in the
latter its essential origin. 95
Thus, we do not fully understanding of these different ways of revealing when we
conceive of them as different modes of truth which stand next to one another, as members
of the same genus, but only in that they are unique moments within the unfolding of truth
itself. In this way we are able to see that the essence of technology is that way which
stands at the completion of this way of unfolding as that which has ruled over the
unfolding of this history itself.
We find ourselves within the historical moment in which Enframing threatens to
conceal the relation of the human to Being; and yet, by becoming attentive to this danger
we are also brought into a new relation with the truth itself. Instead of simply being
fixated upon that which is unconcealed, we now have the power to remain attentive to
that which remains concealed, as it is concealed, in and thorough that which is
unconcealed, and see that this concealment is the source which gives rise to, or grants,
that which is unconcealed. By remaining attentive to 'that which grants,' we free
ourselves up from experiencing it only in its appearance as the challenge of Enframing.
95 Martin Heidegger, "Science and Reflection," 158.
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This freeing claim allows us to experience and thus, comport ourselves toward beings in
a new way. This new relation Heidegger terms Gelassenheit or "releasement toward
things.,,96 This relation is knowingly held open through an effort on the part of the
human, as he seeks to experience beings in their being. This cannot be understood as an
experience of beings in their quantifiability, but in the way in which they presence of
themselves.
This comportment is not an attitude of human making, but it is also not a fate that
is imposed upon him. This reieasement toward beings can only come about and be
sustained through the human's comprehending of his proper relation to the unfolding of
truth and the subsequent taking up of the role of the one who watches over the
unconcealed. This watching is described as a "waiting" by Andrew Mitchell and it is
through this practice of waiting on things that the human comes to properly dwell upon
the earth.
To wait upon a thing's thing-essence, then, is precisely not to challenge it forth, not to decide in
advance how it is to be revealed, and not to demand that it be purely present. Rather to wait upon
a thing's thing-essence is to let the thing rest in its essence, and that means to not be purely
present...When things are allowed to show themselves, they preserve this hiddenness and self-
concealment, and only then can they be said to be whole (Heil).97
It is only through remaining attentive to that which remains concealed in beings that we
are able to allow them to most fully be the beings that they are. Through this the human
does not seek to master beings, but to experience them in the ways in which they offer
themselves; and yet, we have seen that the presencing of beings does not arise from
beings themselves, or from any human power, but is granted from Being. Thus, opening
ourselves to an experience of beings in the ways that they offer themselves means that,
through this experience of beings, Being is recalled and allowed to be responsible as that
which grants to beings their presencing.
96 Martin Heidegger, "Memorial Address," 54.
97 Andrew Mitchell, ed. by Franyois Raffoul and David Pettigrew, "Praxis and Gelassenheit: The 'Practice'
of the Limit," Heidegger and Practical Philosophy (Albany: State University ofNew York, 2002), 329.
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Michael Haar calls this knowing relation between the human and Being the link
of "reciprocal appropriation."
The call of being appearing to man through Technology is not an "event," nor an advent, but one
expression of this singular tantum, the unique, reciprocal appropriation. As such, Ereignis is
already a cure: the "turning" of the oblivion of being into memory, into the watch ofbeing.98
Through the experience of Gelassenheit, beings are able to offer us an experience of
Being in a way that is possible for us, which allows us to remain attentive to the truth of
Being, through our experience of beings.
The question concerning technology has allowed us to save ourselves, beings and
Being. "To save is to fetch something home into its essence, in order to bring the essence
for the first time into genuine appearing.,,99 By remaining attentive to the truth of Being
we are brought to ourselves in a more originary way, in that we are able to comprehend
that our essential actions are not of our making, but are a responding to that which calls
out for us to act. This has allowed us to witness that which has always granted the
possibilities for our actions, even while we previously remained oblivious to this ground.
Thus, through this inquiry we have learned to think through the essential relation of the
human and Being, for the first time, in the way that allows these relations to genuinely
appear. In doing this we have made ourselves free for our own freedom. This is not a
freedom that is determined by human caprice, but free in the sense that we comprehend
that we have the ability to respond to that which claims us.
Through our investigation into the essence of technology, it has been determined
that the human can no longer understood as the ruler of nature or the animal rationale,
but is the one who can distinguish between beings and Being, and thus respond to the
truth of Being. By holding fast to this essential knowledge we have become attuned to a
new possibility, one in which we might be brought more fully into our own human
essence, as we now have the ability to tum toward a new experience of this truth. By
bringing this new experience to light, we have been freed from our fascination with the
98 Michael Haar, The Song a/the Earth, 89.
99 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 28.
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effects of technology so that we might engage it, but in such a way that we are not enrapt
by its extreme effectiveness. Thus, we are now both free to engage it and to leave it
alone. This holds out a promise of a future that is not determined by technology, but one
in which humanity might learn to belong to the realm of beings in a way that is not
determined by its will to dominate, but by its letting beings be in their being. This future
will only be accomplished through a conscious attempt to shelter that which remains
concealed within beings, as an acknowledgement of that which makes possible their
presencing in unconcealment. It will only be through giving ourselves over to this, by
remaining attentive to and remembering Being, that the way will be prepared for us to
come into a new worldly relation in which we are both able to listen and respond to the
Being of beings in a way that is most appropriate for us.
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